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1.0  Executive Summary 
1.1  Background 
This report contains a summary of the results of a multi-year project funded in part by the Federal 
Aviation Administration to develop guidance on the process of developing procedures.  
 
To conduct this work, we performed a far-reaching review of the existing literature on procedures 
that was focused on, but not limited to, aviation. We engaged in extended discussions with 
manufacturers of aircraft and equipment, airline pilots, airline managers, and regulators. We 
examined relevant voluntary safety reports and aircraft accidents, examined existing airline 
procedures, conducted jumpseat observations, and applied knowledge gained from over two decades 
of work with airlines. 
 
A result of this work is summarized here in a 7-step process for developing procedures: 
1. Determining when procedures need to be designed or modified. 
2. Creating a procedure development process.  
3. Understanding the relevant issues. 
4. Crafting procedural solutions.  
5. Writing procedures. 
6. Implementing new procedures.  
7. Evaluating and monitoring the conduct of procedures. 
 
Each of these steps is described briefly in this summary and covered in more detail in the main 
body of this document. When the essence of this process has been followed, we have observed 
substantial improvement in procedures. In one carefully evaluated case, use of new procedures 
developed in accordance with the process described here, lead to an 84% decrease in observed 
errors by airline pilots. 
 
1.2  Determining When Procedures Need to be Designed or Modified 
Procedures may need to be developed or revised whenever new technology, personnel, or operations 
are introduced. Although manufacturers supply their customers with extensive procedures and 
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checklists for operating their equipment, these procedures are usually limited to meeting the 
engineering demands of the technology. Manufacturers sell their products all over the world and 
cannot provide customers with procedures tailored to the customers’ specific needs or operational 
environment. Hence, the introduction of new equipment often calls for new procedures. Changes in 
personnel may also require new procedures. For example, groups of pilots may develop informal 
techniques that support crew coordination. However, when airlines merge, pilots from the newly 
acquired company may have their own techniques. Hence, crews composed of pilots from the 
previously separate airlines may fail to be properly coordinated unless new procedures that formally 
support crew coordination are developed and implemented. Changes to the operation and the 
operational environment are also a reason to develop new procedures. For example, the introduction 
of new routes (especially to new international destinations) frequently calls for new procedures. 
Finally, operators may decide to revise procedures or create new ones when no change has occurred 
but operational problems have been discovered. 
 
1.3  Creating a Procedure Development Process 
Prior to beginning work on developing or modifying procedures, a systematic development process 
should be created. To be successful, developers must have access to expertise, resources, and 
information. Developing good procedures requires access to particular types of knowledge. Because 
procedures govern the interactions between pilots, their technology, and the operational 
environment, the procedure development process will always require access to expertise in technical 
domains, human factors, and operations. Procedure developers must have access to many different 
sources of information. This includes, but is not limited to, technical specifications, voluntary event 
reports, and automatically recorded flight data. In simple cases, a single individual may be able to 
develop the required procedures. In more complex situations, it will be necessary to engage an entire 
procedure development team with individuals selected for their particular knowledge and skills. In 
addition, procedure developers must create a realistic plan for carrying out all of the steps in the 
procedure development process and management must allocate the needed resources. Failing to 
allocate adequate time or resources to procedure development can cause the process to fail. 
 
1.4  Understanding the Relevant Issues 
Procedures guide the interaction between people, technology, and the operational environment. 
Hence, to devise effective procedures, developers must understand the capabilities of each of these 
components and the constraints that they impose on the operation. Developers must also understand 
how these components interact in the context of the tasks that must be performed. This basic 
concept, which we refer to as THE (Technology, Human, Environment) framework, has important 
implications. For example, it drives decisions about what information must be obtained before the 
procedure design process can commence and what qualifications will be required of individuals who 
are selected to be part of the procedure development team.  
 
An important tool for building understanding of the relevant issues is a systematic task analysis. The 
focus of this analysis depends on the particulars of the situation. When new procedures are 
developed in response to the introduction of a new aircraft or other technology, changes in the 
operational environment, or adding a new personnel group, the primary causal factor is clear. Hence, 
the analysis can focus on how the new technology, environment, or people will affect the operation. 
When the procedure development process is commenced due to problem reports, it is often not clear 
what factors are involved. Hence, the analysis must focus on understanding the causes of the 
problematic events. However, in every case a systematic task analysis must be performed and this 
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analysis must consider multiple factors and how interactions between these factors might affect the 
operation. It is often tempting to focus exclusively on a single factor or to design procedural “band-
aid” solutions that address only the surface problem without identifying the underlying causes. Such 
solutions often prove ineffective or even counterproductive. Only when underlying causes are 
identified and properly addressed, can effective solutions be crafted. 
 
1.5  Crafting Procedural Solutions 
Before beginning to craft a new procedure, the first question that one should ask is “Do we need this 
procedure?” Some tasks do not need to be proceduralized. In many cases, pilots may be allowed to 
perform actions as they see fit. Overproceduralization—creating and mandating the use of 
procedures when they are not needed—can be counter-productive and encourage non-compliance. 
Assuming that a procedure should be created, the next question to be asked is “What are the goals of 
the procedure?” In addition to accomplishing a task, procedures may have a variety of other goals 
such as conserving fuel or saving time. 
 
These goals of procedures are distinct from the requirements for procedures. The primary 
requirement for any procedure is that it be correct. That is, it must produce the outcome that it was 
designed to produce. Furthermore, the procedure should be reliable; under normal conditions, the 
procedure should always produce the desired outcome every time the actions demanded by the 
procedure are executed. Also, the procedure should be robust; it should be usable across a 
reasonably broad range of circumstances. In addition, procedures should be resilient enough so that 
minor faults, errors, or unexpected departures from expected conditions can be easily overcome and 
the desired outcomes achieved. 
 
In addition to these basic requirements, there are a number of subsidiary criteria (discussed in the 
main body of this document), such as procedural efficiency, consistency, usability, trainability, 
coordination, and integration that support these requirements. These subsidiary criteria are not 
independent of each other; in many cases one criterion may need to be traded off against another.  
 
In addition to attempting to satisfy these goals and requirements, developers need to consider how 
the procedure will fit with other procedures. We make the distinction between “task procedures” 
which are focused on accomplishing a particular task (e.g., “Engine Start”) and “phase procedures” 
which are composed of multiple sequential or interwoven task procedures (e.g., “Before Taxi”), 
although the individual task procedures may not be identified by name. Also, developers should 
consider how the procedure would fit within the entire system of procedures. For example, a 
procedure system that imposes a strict regimen on the pilots in one operation but grants the Captain 
substantial discretionary authority in another similar operation is ripe for confusion and voluntary 
non-compliance.  
 
Ideally, all procedures would be consistent with one another because they would have been designed 
to fall within an already established set of policies and an overarching operational philosophy. In 
addition to guiding procedure development, policies can be used to guide pilot actions when no 
procedure exists. One cannot anticipate every possible circumstance, and procedures cannot be 
developed for situations that are not anticipated. This structure by which an operational philosophy 
guides the development of policies that in turn guide the design of procedures, which control 
practices on the line, is referred to as the 4Ps. Like all topics mentioned in this summary, the 4Ps are 
discussed in more detail in the main body of this document. 
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In designing procedures, developers typically utilize different types of steps (described in the main 
body of this document) depending on what actions need to be accomplished. However, every 
procedure should clearly state 5 things: (1) what the procedure is designed to accomplish; (2) when 
and/or under what conditions the procedure should be executed; (3) who is responsible for executing 
each step in the procedure; (4) how, in detail, the procedure is to be performed; and (5) how to 
confirm that the procedure has been accomplished properly. The procedure developer should be able 
to specify these elements for each step in the procedure. However, it may be possible to simplify the 
content of the steps when one or more of these elements are consistent across the steps.  
 
Procedures may also need to protect against adverse events. To avoid entering unacceptable states, 
procedure developers can use a combination of procedural margins, barriers, and buffers. Like 
physical barriers, procedural barriers are used to prevent undesirable actions. Margins are used to 
create some space prior to reaching the barrier, and buffers are used to avoid or reduce damage in 
case both the margins and the barrier are breached. 
 
The procedure design process itself is cyclical, following 5 steps which are repeated as necessary: 
(1) develop a prototype task procedure; (2) analyze the prototype procedure; (3) eliminate conflicts 
between factors; (4) develop the encompassing phase procedure; and (5) test the procedure.  
 
Testing the procedure is an important though often neglected step. Several different levels of 
formative testing should be used—from mentally running through the procedure to using the 
procedure in a simulated or actual flight. If the underlying issues have been properly analyzed and 
understood, it is likely that the original prototype procedure will be reasonably close to the final 
procedure on the first attempt. However, it is very difficult to predict the effects of all possible 
interactions between the technology, human factors, and operational conditions. The time to discover 
possible problems with a procedure is before the procedure is released for use. During the testing 
process, conflicts between the constraints imposed by the technological requirements, operational 
demands, and human factors limitations may be detected. When these conflicts are observed, the 
procedure should be modified to reduce or eliminate the problems. To eliminate or reduce these 
problems, one may: (a) alter the timing of individual steps; (b) transfer the responsibility for 
executing individual steps from one crewmember to another; or (c) alter one or more steps.  
 
1.6  Checklists  
In this document, we have devoted a section to checklists because of their special status among 
phase procedures. Checklists are a special type of procedure. On the flight deck, they are important 
tools for ensuring that the work is done correctly. Checklists are the prototypical example of 
procedures. They are often the form into which extended procedures are distilled, and the most 
common and most frequent form in which people interact with formal procedures. In addition to the 
design of the list itself, the checklist procedure includes the manner in which the checklist is to be 
executed (e.g., silent, challenge-and-response). Like any procedure, once a prototype checklist has 
been developed, it must be analyzed and tested using the same tools and methodology used with any 
procedure. All potential conflicts must be addressed, and the checklist must be thoroughly tested for 
feasibility and practicality.  
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1.7  Writing Procedures 
Once procedures are developed, they must be effectively communicated. In this section of the main 
document, guidelines for the written communication of procedures are presented. These guidelines 
may apply differently, depending on whether the procedure under development is a detailed 
procedure or a checklist, and on whether it is a procedure/checklist for normal operations or for non-
normal or emergency situations. 
 
1.8  Implementing New Procedures 
Implementation is an important, but often neglected, part of the procedure development process. For 
a procedure development process to be successful, the new or modified procedures must be 
effectively disseminated, properly trained, and appropriately promoted. In this section of the main 
body of this document, the issues that arise in implementing procedures are considered and a 
framework for the implementation process is briefly described  
 
1.9  Evaluating and Monitoring the Conduct of Procedures in Practice 
New procedures need to be evaluated prior to their release and following their implementation. 
Evaluation should not be regarded as an unnecessary task that can be performed if there is time and 
extra resources. Evaluation is a critical part of the development process and an important guard 
against the potential failure of the whole endeavor. 
 
No matter how many smart people are working on a procedure design and development project, 
errors will occur and unintended consequences will materialize. The only way to catch mistakes and 
avoid costly new problems is to perform a careful evaluation. Developers might all agree that a set 
of new procedures is reasonable, but the procedures must be tested in a simulator, tried by other 
pilots, and tested on the line, where the world is much more complex than in the simulator. The new 
procedures must be given a chance to fail. 
 
A well-designed outcome evaluation is a systematic way to find problems in proposed procedures 
before they are implemented. The evaluation allows for testing whether the new procedures work 
in the environment for which they were designed and with the people who will be using them. A 
thorough evaluation can discover problems that were not anticipated and generate solutions 
before the problems produce serious consequences. Systematic evaluation is not inherently 
difficult; data can be obtained from multiple sources including line observations, automatically 
recorded flight data, voluntary reports, and surveys. But like understanding the problems that led 
to the need for new procedures, a proper evaluation requires particular skills that may or may not 
be present in the development team or even in the airline. Hence, advance planning and resource 
allocation is required.  
 
 
2.0  Procedure Design Process 
2.1  Step 1: Determining When Procedures Need to be Designed or Modified 
Operators are required to provide flightcrews with operating procedures (14 CFR 121.135), and with 
cockpit check procedures (14 CFR 121.315). Equipment manufacturers, especially aircraft 
manufacturers, supply their customers with extensive procedures and checklists for operating their 
equipment. However, these procedures are usually limited to the engineering demands of the 
technology, and are generic in their applicability. Manufacturers aim to sell their products all over 
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the world and cannot provide customers with procedures tailored to their specific needs, culture, and 
operational environment. Thus, operators often must modify and augment the manufacturer’s 
procedures to suit their own needs. Although the manufacturer knows the engineering requirements 
of the equipment, the manufacturer is not an operator and may not be sensitive to all the demands of 
the environment in which the equipment will be operated. 
 
Operators often find themselves in situations in which they must develop their own procedures or 
modify the procedures and checklists provided with the equipment they purchased. Often, these 
situations arise in response to changes in the operator or in the operation. In some cases, the change 
is sudden and large, as in the case of a merger or the introduction of NextGen-type operations (e.g., 
RNP/RNAV departures and arrivals). In other cases, new procedures might be required when 
incremental or small changes to any of the many aspects of the operation have accumulated to the 
point that existing procedures are no longer effective, as in the gradual transition of a fleet from 
classic models of a given aircraft to modern advanced models (e.g., a transition from operating 
mostly the B737-200/300/400 to operating the B737-700/800/900). 
 
In general, the need to develop new procedures or modify existing procedures arise from four 
root causes: 
1. New technology. The introduction of new equipment often calls for new procedures. The 
change can be a large one, as when the new equipment relies on a different design 
philosophy from the previously operated equipment; for instance, the introduction of an 
Airbus model to a previously all-Boeing carrier. The technology change might also be a 
small one as in the introduction of a new on-board printer for the ACARS, which requires 
a new procedure for replacing the paper. And the change can be somewhere in between as 
in the introduction of a new on-board tablet computer as an electronic flight bag (EFB) 
which not only requires a new procedure for its own operation, but is also a new way of 
presenting and interacting with other procedures. 
2. New personnel. New people may also require new procedures. For example, a merger is 
likely to produce a large change in the backgrounds of the pilot population. The change 
may also be incremental, as when a pilot body of mainly former military pilots gradually 
changes into one composed mainly of pilots who came out of General Aviation. The 
desire to standardize the operation in spite of the different operational cultures from which 
the new people come and the different training these people received often leads to the 
need to develop new procedures. 
3. New operation. Changes to the operation and the operational environment are also a 
reason to develop new procedures. For example, the introduction of new routes, especially 
routes to new international destinations, calls for new procedures, as would the 
introduction of ETOPS. Rising fuel costs may lead to decisions to employ single-engine 
taxi and use external power and air at the gate; these decisions would lead to the need to 
develop new procedures. Likewise, the introduction of new navigational capabilities and 
requirements such as GPS and RNP may change the operational environment and create a 
need for new operators’ procedures. 
4. Observed operational problem. Operators may decide to revise procedures or create new 
ones in response to a single event, incident, or accident or in response to a series of 
operational problems. Operators may decide to proactively change procedures in response 
to safety data or incident reports. The decision to modify or create procedures may be 
prompted by new requirements from regulators or recommendations from accident 
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investigators. Changes to procedures may also be prompted by the desire to improve 
operational efficiency in ways that are not directly related to safety.  
 
2.2  Step 2: Creating a Procedure Development Process 
Prior to beginning the task of developing or modifying procedures, a systematic process should be 
developed that will guide the developers. To be successful, the developers must have: 
1. Access to expertise. Developing good procedures requires access to particular types of 
knowledge. Regardless of the particular circumstances driving the need for new or 
modified procedures (see Step 1 above), the procedure development process must start 
with a careful analysis of the factors driving the need to develop or modify the 
procedures and the implications of these factors. Because procedures govern the 
interactions between the pilots and the technology in the operational environment, the 
procedure development process will always require access to expertise in technical 
domains, human factors, and operations. 
2. Access to information. Procedure developers should have access to many different 
sources of information. This includes ASAP and FOQA data as well as access to 
employee groups who might be affected by the procedures in question. These include 
cabin crew, maintenance, dispatch, and ground ops/ramp personnel in addition to pilots. 
Furthermore, the development team should have liaisons with the FAA/POI office, ATC, 
and relevant airports.  
3. Access to management. Because each individual procedure resides within the context of 
the larger system of procedures (see discussion of the 4Ps below), the procedure 
development process will always require access to knowledge of the organization’s 
philosophy and polices. If the philosophy and policies are in conflict or do not exist, the 
developers must be able to obtain resolutions from management. 
4. Access to resources. Procedure developers need access to financial and personnel 
resources that are adequate for carrying out all of the necessary steps in the procedure 
development process. In simple cases, procedures may be developed by a single 
individual. In more complex situations, and most situations are more complex than they 
appear, it will be necessary to engage an entire procedure development team. 
Often, flightdeck procedures are best developed by a team that brings different skills and 
perspectives into the design process. The team should include expertise in technology, 
human factors, and operations. In addition, because procedures are used by both Captains 
and First Officers, both perspectives should be represented on the team. To facilitate the 
implementation of changes to procedures, especially the implementation of large scale 
changes as in the case of a merger or the introduction of a new fleet, it would be beneficial 
to have on the team some representation of management and union, safety, training, and 
standards units. A single individual team member can cover multiple functions. For 
example, a senior Captain who is a Check Airman and a management pilot, or a junior FO 
who is a member of the union safety committee. 
To support the work of the team, it is advisable to have an administrative assistant who 
can document the work of the team. This documentation is often crucial to the approval of 
the procedures, the design of needed training, and the implementation of any changes. 
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5. Training. When the team is assembled, even if the “team” is a single person, some training 
would be useful, including the content of this document and/or related sources. In 
particular, it is important for team members to understand the system of procedures and 
how they fit within the framework of existing policies, and the company’s overall 
operational philosophy. This understanding is necessary because the company’s 
philosophy and its policies guide the development of procedures, and because any new 
procedure must be consistent with this guidance as well as with all other procedures.  
6. Development plan. The procedure developers must create a realistic plan for carrying out 
all of the steps in the procedure development process. Failing to allocate adequate time or 
resources to procedure development can cause the process to fail. 
 
Once it has been decided that a change to existing procedures is needed or that new procedures must 
be designed, and a team has been assembled and trained, the process detailed below can guide the 
team’s work. 
 
2.3  Step 3: Understanding the Relevant Issues 
A procedure development process is typically established in response to: the adoption of new 
technology (e.g., new aircraft, FMS software upgrade), a change in the operational environment 
(e.g., a new route structure), a substantial change in personnel (e.g., a merger), or reports of one or 
more critical events (e.g., an accident, incident, or pilot reports). 
 
When the procedure development process is established in response to the introduction of a new 
aircraft or other technology, to changes in the operational environment, or to adding a new personnel 
group, the primary causal factor driving the need for new or modified procedures is clear. Hence, the 
analysis will focus on how the new technology, environment, or people will affect the operation. It 
should also consider how interactions between this primary factor and the other factors will affect 
the operation. In these cases, data should be collected to determine the likely effects that these 
factors will have on the operation. It is often tempting to focus exclusively on a single factor. For 
example, when a new technology is introduced, procedure developers may be tempted to focus 
exclusively on addressing the requirements of the technology, ignoring human factors issues and 
operational constraints. However, procedures developed without a broad understanding of the task 
are likely to generate problems. These problems may be avoided if a broad task analysis is 
conducted first. 
 
When the procedure development process is commenced due to problem reports, it is not necessarily 
clear what factors are involved. Hence, the analysis will focus on understanding the causes of the 
triggering events. In this case, the analysis does not have a clear starting point. The observed events 
may be caused by a single factor or multiple factors or be the result of a complex interaction. In this 
case, data should be collected to identify the causal factors and their effects. Whenever the procedure 
development process is triggered by a problem report, procedure developers may be tempted to 
design procedural “band-aid” solutions that address only the surface problem without identifying the 
underlying causes. Such solutions often prove ineffective or even counterproductive. When 
underlying causes are clearly identified and properly addressed, solutions can be crafted that are very 
effective and address what might initially seem like disparate problems. 
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For example, at first glance, the following two events appear very different from one another: 
• A report of a rejected takeoff, after the crew failed to set the flaps.  
• A report of a runway incursion, after the crew followed the wrong taxiway. 
 
It is tempting to propose quick fixes for each of these cases: add a checklist item confirming the flap 
setting just prior to taking the runway; add a procedure step requiring the FO to call out the identifier 
of every taxiway before proceeding onto the it. However, on closer examination, these events may 
share an underlying causal pattern. For example: 
• The crew in the rejected takeoff incident was performing their “before takeoff” procedures 
while taxiing to the runway; this procedure was interrupted at the point at which they 
usually set the flaps. 
• The crew in the runway incursion incident was performing their “before takeoff” 
procedures when they were supposed to make a turn. 
 
Hence, on closer examination, it is clear that these are not two separate problems but evidence of a 
single problem—a conflict between procedural demands and operational demands. The solution to 
this problem is resolving that conflict (e.g., by moving the point in time at which the “before takeoff 
procedure” is performed; see “Eliminating Conflicts” below). 
 
Whether the procedure development process is motivated by a planned change or by an observed 
problem, procedure developers must gather and interpret the relevant information and conduct a task 
analysis. Potential sources of relevant information and a brief description of a task analysis 
methodology are presented in this section. 
 
2.3.1  Sources of Data 
The personal experiences of procedure developers are an important source of data. These data can be 
used to form hypotheses about the nature of the problem and to shape the search for more data. But 
there are a number of other sources of data that should be considered. It is important that data are 
sought from many sources, so that an accurate overall picture can be formed and the underlying 
causal factors identified. 
 
2.3.1.1  Technical Information 
Airline. Most airlines have a great deal of information available internally. In addition to the 
knowledge possessed by Technical Pilots in Flight Operations, other departments (e.g., Dispatch, 
Maintenance, Ground Operations, and Cabin) may also have individuals with substantial technical 
expertise. Pilot unions are another potential source of expertise in the company. In addition to their 
personal knowledge, these individuals may serve on national committees and working groups and 
have access to a wide range of information sources. 
 
Manufacturers. In addition to engineering data and analyses, manufacturers typically maintain 
databases of problems experienced by their customers, solutions that have been tried, and the 
results of these interventions. These data are a good source of information about how the 
equipment has been used by other airlines that may be operating in similar operational 
environments with similar procedures. 
 
Other Airlines. Airlines, especially their safety departments, often have open and active lines of 
communication. Under the safety umbrella, they work together to solve common issues. Contacting 
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other airlines to find out if they have faced similar situations and how they have addressed them can 
save time and help generate effective solutions. 
  
Academic/Research Organizations. Data and information can also come from universities, 
government (e.g., FAA, NASA), and private research organizations. These organizations may be 
able to support the development process in many different ways, from providing technical 
information to conducting original research.  
 
2.3.1.2  Operational Information 
Line Observations. Line observations can be conducted to document the operational context. Many 
airlines have an ongoing Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) program. Procedures developers 
may be able to take advantage of existing LOSA efforts. If the necessary data is not already being 
collected, specific items may be inserted into the LOSA protocols. If the airline does not have an 
ongoing LOSA program, a line observation program targeted at the information needs of the 
procedure development process may be designed and conducted. As with any LOSA, the effort will 
provide unbiased information only when the observations are conducted to observe the operation and 
the operational context, and not to evaluate the flight crews. 
 
Surveys/Focus Groups. Another way to gain insight into the operational context is through the 
conduct of surveys and/or focus groups. However, constructing good surveys and running useful 
focus groups requires methodological knowledge and skill. Although asking questions may seem 
straightforward, poor question design can lead to misleading results. Developers should consult with 
knowledgeable sources before attempting to use these techniques. 
  
Incident and Accidents Reports. Incident reports from NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System 
(ASRS): http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/), carrier Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) programs or 
other internal reporting systems, and the FAA Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing 
(ASIAS): http://www.asias.faa.gov) database are all excellent sources of data. Databases usually 
come with sophisticated search tools. Reporters often include their own analysis as to why the 
reported events took place, though these explanations should not be automatically accepted.  
 
Accident reports are also a good source of information. Fortunately, there are very few accidents, but 
those that are thoroughly investigated can provide insights into normal operations and can also 
suggest the kind of questions that should be asked when analyzing other data. Reports can be 
downloaded e.g., from the NTSB database (http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/index.aspx) 
or Skybrary (http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Main_Page) (which includes reports from all over 
the world). And there is a host of other sources with information about aviation safety issues and 
events from around the world (e.g., the Flight Safety Foundation website (http://flightsafety.org/ and 
the CAST, Commercial Aviation Safety Team website (http://www.cast-safety.org). 
 
FOQA/FDAP/FDM.  Programs such as Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA), Flight Data 
Analysis Program (FDAP), and Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) use the data recorders available on 
the aircraft to support carrier operations. These data can be used to determine details of what 
happened during a flight. For example, these data can be used to determine what the aircraft was 
doing during an unstable approach, a rejected takeoff, or a takeoff with the APU running. However, 
the recording devices cannot capture the operational context (e.g., weather, cabin crew activities) 
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and cannot tell why events happened. To help construct the whole picture, these data must be 
combined with data from other sources, such as ASRS and ASAP. 
 
2.3.1.3  Data Analysis 
Once data is gathered, it must be analyzed to identify the underlying patterns. Different types of data 
require different types of methodological expertise. This expertise often can be found within the 
airline but may need to be obtained elsewhere. What procedure developers must do is to ask the right 
questions. These questions can follow the “5 Whys” process. The goal of data analysis is to form a 
detailed, comprehensive, and correct picture of the common patterns across events and their 
underlying causes. To reveal such underlying causes, the question “why” is asked at least 5 
successive times. Of course, there is nothing magical about the number 5. Complex issues may 
require more than 5 questions, but asking “why?” five times is a good place to start. 
 
For example, in response to a reported rise in the number of unstable approaches, one might ask 
some version of this series of questions: 
1. Why were the approaches considered unstable? 
• According to FOQA data, the aircraft involved did not meet the stabilized approach 
criteria at the mandatory 1,000 foot go-around gate. 
2. Why did the crews not go around per procedure?  
• Perhaps no command to go-around was given. 
• Perhaps the command was ignored.  
3. If the required go-around command at 1,000 foot was not made, why wasn’t it made?  
• Given ASAP data, perhaps the crew realized that they were not meeting the stabilized 
approach criteria and deliberately chose to deviate from the approach procedure 
requiring a go-around—a case of selective non-compliance.  
• Perhaps the crew did not realize their unstable condition until very late in the 
approach.  
4. If the crew decided to deviate from the procedure, why did the crew think that it would be 
acceptable to deviate from the procedure? 
• Given relevant weather and airport data, perhaps the crew decided that given the good 
visibility, the long runway, and the healthy headwind, a safe landing could be made.  
5. But, why did the crew decide that they should ignore the mandated procedure?  
• Given responses to a survey of the pilot group, perhaps the recent company emphasis 
on fuel savings (that led to reduced minimum fuel requirements, extensive tanking 
of fuel from cheap stations, and a push for single-engine taxi) has also led crews to 
avoid “expensive” go-arounds.  
6. Why do the pilots feel that a go-around would be considered so expensive that safety could 
be compromised? 
• Given pilot input through focus groups and a survey, perhaps the crew thought that 
safety wasn’t really compromised, that the go-around requirements are too strict, and 
that the company is much more concerned with costs and on-time performance than 
with such minor violations. 
 
  
12 
 
Of course, other “why” questions and answers are possible. The answers to the questions are 
determined by data, not arguments. The subsequent questions depend on the answers to the 
previous questions.  
 
Different answers to the different “why” questions would suggest different potential interventions. 
From negotiating with ATC about early approach clearances to negotiating with management about 
fuel saving measures, there could be a wide range of relevant interventions to reduce the number of 
unstable approaches. Furthermore, the analysis of the seemingly specific problem of unstable 
approaches can easily lead to the recognition of much larger systemic issues such as the impact of 
fuel saving measures on pilots’ decision making.  
 
Often, a thorough analysis will reveal that pilots may not fully understand the rationale for a policy 
or procedure. Asking “why don’t pilots understand that rationale?” could reveal that the procedures 
were introduced without sufficient effort to educate the pilot group on the rationale for the change. 
Thus, a thorough analysis—driven by insisting on asking “why?”—can lead to interventions that 
solve the original problem and improve other operations as well. 
 
Although it might seem quick and simple, an additional procedure or an added line item on a 
checklist may not always be the best solution. 
 
2.3.1.4  Task Analysis 
In some cases, it may be necessary to construct procedures from scratch. But in most cases, there 
will be an existing procedure that needs be revised or adapted to work within the airline operation. 
For example, an airline may want to purchase a new aircraft or install a new piece of equipment in 
aircraft that are already on the line, open routes to new destinations, or merge with another airline. In 
all of these cases, there are likely to be existing procedures from manufactures and/or the airline that 
can serve as a starting point for the development of the new procedures. However, whether there are 
existing procedures or not, the first step in developing a procedure is to become familiar with the 
requirements of the mission that will be performed, the constraints imposed by the operational 
environment, and the capabilities and limitations of the technology and people that will be engaged 
in the task. This requires a systematic task analysis in which these components are analyzed. 
Depending on the scope of the proposed changes, this analysis may require a substantial amount of 
effort. However, once developed, a completely new analysis does not need to be produced for every 
proposed change. The existing work may be modified as needed. 
 
Task Analysis Framework 
To begin the analysis, the mission requirements for each part of the operation that the proposed 
change will affect need to be specified at a moderate level of granularity. For example, if a proposed 
change were to affect the climb phase of flight, then the essential requirements for the operation 
during this phase would be listed (e.g., acceleration, climbing at climb thrust, heading changes, level 
off at cruise altitude, etc.). This step in the procedure development process produces a framework 
that can increase in detail as necessary. In some cases (e.g., the implementation of a new flight 
release format), this step will be focused on one part of a single phase of flight. In other cases (e.g., 
installation of a new datalink communication system), the entire operation from gate to gate may be 
affected. Because timing is crucial in understanding how various factors will affect the procedures, 
these requirements and all other parts of the analysis must be delineated chronologically. 
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Once the mission requirements have been broadly defined, the requirements imposed on the 
procedure by the capabilities of the technology, humans, and operational environment must be 
specified. Although no single one of these three components will take precedence in all situations, 
the constraints imposed by one component, often the technology or the operational environment, will 
appear most salient. It is critical to be able to ignore that appearance, and allocate proper time and 
attention to all three components. The analysis of each component is briefly summarized below. 
 
Operational Environment 
Designing good procedures requires an understanding of the effects of the environment outside the 
cockpit on operations. The operational environment includes the physical and non-physical factors 
that may impact the operation. Physical factors include issues such as terrain, airport layout, and 
weather. Non-physical factors include interactions with support personnel—such as the cabin crew, 
ground crew, and dispatch—organizational factors—such as company policies, and culture—and 
regulatory factors—such as air traffic control instructions and airspace restrictions. For example, the 
climb phase could be affected by physical factors such as winds, terrain, and convective activity, by 
interactions with support groups such as advising the cabin crew when to begin service, 
organizational factors such as a fuel-savings policy, and regulatory factors, such as noise abatement 
procedures, SIDs and ad hoc ATC instructions to level off and/or change headings. 
 
Analysis: To determine the potential effects of the operational environment on an operation, one can 
start either with an analysis of the environment or with an analysis of the operation. This information 
can then be used to mold the actions required to deal with these effects into procedures. If the airline 
is already conducting operations in the planned environment, the effects of physical, support, 
organizational, and regulatory factors on the operation can be determined by observing line 
operations and identifying the ways in which the operations are affected by these factors. If the 
airline is not operating in the environment, this information will need to be obtained from other 
sources (e.g., experience of other airlines). The effects of environmental factors on the operation can 
then be added to the task analysis framework. 
 
The process for analyzing the effects of the operational environment involves answering 4 questions: 
1. What physical phenomena must be taken into account and how might they affect the 
operation? 
2. What interactions with support personnel may occur and how might they affect the 
operation? 
3. What organizational factors must be taken into account and how might they affect the 
operation? 
4. What regulatory constraints are present and how might they affect the operation? 
 
Application: In an ideal world, flight operations, and hence procedures, would be linear, predictable 
and controllable. Step B would always follow Step A, and Step C would always follow Step B. 
Events would always be predictable, information (such as ATC clearances) would always be 
available when needed, and all activities would be under the direct and complete control of the flight 
crew. However, this ideal world does not exist. Procedures must reflect the realities of the operation, 
not a fictitious ideal world. 
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In general, several approaches can be taken when dealing with a complex and unpredictable 
operational environment: 
1. Simplify the environment or interactions with it. For example, it may be possible to 
simplify the operational environment by altering routes to avoid complex airspace or 
hazardous areas. Interactions with the environment may be simplified by eliminating 
activities (e.g., calls to dispatch) or changing when tasks (e.g., climb checklist) are 
performed to quiescent periods. 
2. Build conditional procedures. It may be possible to build procedures that include 
conditional (i.e., if x then y; if not x then z) statements to deal with a complex 
environment. For example, “IF the OAT is between +2C and -24C AND there is visible 
moisture, select Anti-ice ON.” 
3. Build robust procedures. It may be possible to build robust procedures that will work 
effectively despite variations in the operational environment. For example, to avoid 
needing to determine where ADS-B is available, a procedure could state “Select ADS-B 
ON. Note: Do NOT rely on ADS-B TIS information. ADS-B may not be available.” 
4. Build resilient procedures. Incorporate steps into procedures and/or add checklists that will 
facilitate recovery from problems induced by unpredictable or uncontrollable aspects of 
the environment. For example, a procedure may call for spooling up jet engines on 
approach in the event that power is required quickly for an unanticipated go-around. 
5. Build policies instead of procedures. Provide guidance through policies when the 
environmental conditions make procedure development impossible or impractical. For 
example, rather than attempting to write procedures that specify the FMS mode to be selected 
in all possible cases, the airline could adopt an “automation policy” that sets guidelines for 
making the decision of which mode to select and leaves the choice to the pilot. 
 
Technology 
All machines have capabilities (things they are designed to do) and limitations. Depending on the 
equipment, these limitations may include physical limits (e.g., weight, altitude, temperature, 
humidity, etc.), functional limits (e.g., range), and processing limits (e.g., operations per unit of time, 
memory capacity) among others. In many cases, machines have an optimal range in which they 
operate best. Sometimes, the technology can be made to operate outside this optimal range, but with 
degraded performance. Good procedures keep the technology within its optimal range. Designing 
good procedures requires an accurate functional understanding of how the technology operates.  
 
Analysis: Understanding how a piece of technology functions does not require understanding the 
underlying engineering. However, it does require understanding all of the relevant behaviors—states 
and modes—of the machine. This means that the function of each state/mode and its associated 
behaviors, the causes and effects of transitions between system states, how pilots can interact with 
the system, the meaning of displayed indications, and the effects of machine failures and external 
disturbances on the machine’s behaviors must be understood before procedures utilizing the 
technology are developed.  
 
The process of analyzing technology involves answering 7 questions: 
1. What are the possible states, configurations, or modes of the machine, what does each 
of them control, and what are the limits of each? For example, which control surfaces 
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are operated by which hydraulic system? In VNAV Path, is speed controlled by pitch 
or thrust? 
2. What conditions or targets (e.g., airspeed, altitude, thrust level, etc.) trigger the transitions 
between states or modes? For example, does automatic fuel transfer stop at a particular 
quantity level or after a given number of minutes of flow? At what point does HDG 
transition to LOC when LOC is armed for the approach? 
3. What are the possible sequences of state transitions? That is, what will happen when the 
targets are achieved and what will happen if they are not achieved? For example, if the 
main tanks are within 50 lbs of each other, will fuel transfer stop? If the localizer signal is 
lost, what will the AFS command? 
4. From what sources (e.g., sensors, FMC, MCP/FCU/FCP) does the system obtain 
information and what will happen if these sources fail? For example, if a fuel flow sensor 
fails, will fuel transfer cease? Under what conditions does the AFS obtain altitude from 
the barometric altimeter rather than the radio altimeter? What happens if the radio 
altimeter fails? 
5. How long (what is the range and under what conditions) will it take for the system to 
achieve the desired effect? For example, how long will it take for the landing gear to 
extend and lock in an aging aircraft? How long does it take to transfer fuel from one tank 
to another? 
6. Under what conditions does each state or sequence produce optimal, sub-optimal, or 
dangerous behaviors? For example, if a main tank leaks fuel, will fuel be automatically 
transferred into it and then lost? In a late descent, under what conditions will VNAV make 
the next crossing restriction? If an inflight hydraulic leak impacts 2 of 3 hydraulic 
systems, how will it affect the remainder of the flight? How does an electrical 
reconfiguration due to a generator failure impact the autoflight system? 
7. What steps can be taken to encourage optimal operation and avoid dangerous states? For 
example, how should a “throttle bump” be conducted to verify that the flaps are in the 
takeoff configuration, and what would it really test? 
 
Answers to these questions are typically available from the manufacturer. Once this information is 
obtained, the desired sequence of modes/states and alternatives can be incorporated into the task 
analysis framework. 
 
Application: Although manufacturers typically provide procedures for their products, the 
manufacturer may not have considered the characteristics of all of the possible operational 
environments or how their equipment will work with other technologies installed in the aircraft. 
Hence, manufacturers’ procedures frequently need to be adapted or modified. To obtain optimal 
performance and avoid dangerous states, it may be necessary to add procedural steps that ensure that 
relevant indications are checked and that operational margins are maintained. In some cases, several 
different actions can be used to accomplish a task. The optimal configuration may depend on 
particular circumstances. At this point in the analysis, the alternate states/modes and the relevant 
conditions should be incorporated into the task analysis framework. 
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Humans 
Like machines, humans have capabilities and limitations. Good procedures build on human strengths 
and compensate for human limitations, just as they do with the capabilities and constraints of the 
technology. Many problems in operations arise from conflicts between human limitations and the 
demands placed on the pilots by procedures that may take into account the requirements of the 
technology and the demands of the operational environment but do not properly account for human 
limitations. Thus, understanding the strengths and limitations of the human is critical for designing 
good procedures. 
 
Analysis and Application. Humans are very complex. Although it is difficult to produce a 
comprehensive analysis of human capabilities and limitations, a useful picture can be obtained by 
using a type of Cognitive Task Analysis. Human functioning can be analyzed into a set of processes. 
The procedure developer can then determine how these processes will be utilized in the operation as 
the pilots interact with the technology and the operational environment. Procedures can then be 
designed so that human functioning on each of these processes is kept safely within limitations. 
Below, these “human factors” are grouped into three categories: basic processes that are likely to be 
involved in all activities, higher-order processes that will be involved in many but not all activities, 
and inter-individual processes that may influence any activity but will be particularly salient when 
the pilots are interacting with each other and with other people. Examples of common issues are 
provided under each heading. 
 
Basic processes:  
1. Bio-psychological factors. Humans are built to operate within a relatively narrow range of 
conditions. To function well, our bodies need to be kept at an appropriate temperature, 
with continual access to oxygen at appropriate concentrations and pressures, and with 
water, food, and sleep every few hours. Furthermore, our bodies are set to function on a 
regular circadian rhythm – a daily cycle of light and dark, wakefulness and sleep. If these 
limitations are violated, physical and cognitive performance will be impaired. Procedures 
should aim to keep the pilots within their optimal range of biological conditions. For 
example, procedures should not require both pilots to be continually at their stations 
during turn-arounds so that they are unable to obtain food for extended periods of time. 
2. Perception. Perception refers to the physiological and psychological processes involved in 
sensing the outside world and the translation of these sensations into useful information. 
Perceptual processes are subject to a number of biases and illusions. Expectancy effects 
(e.g., seeing what is expected rather than what’s actually there) are particularly powerful. 
Procedures should be designed to avoid these biases when possible and to compensate for 
them when they cannot be avoided. For example, procedures that require both pilots to 
verify a value (e.g., flap setting) are more likely to be resilient than procedures that require 
only one pilot to check the setting. 
3. Attention. Although people can perceive signals (e.g., light, sound) simultaneously from 
multiple sources, they can focus attention on only one source at a time. Attention is 
drawn by change (e.g., flashing alerts, alarms) and directed to items of perceived 
importance. Attention will shift when the available information does not change. 
Procedures should avoid requiring pilots to maintain attention on unchanging displays. 
Procedures should direct pilots to appropriate sources of information for each task; 
“multi-tasking”—attempting to perform multiple tasks at the same time—should be 
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avoided. For example, when more than one task must be accomplished at the same time, 
the tasks must either be divided between the pilots or the steps for each task interleaved 
so that the steps that require attention to one task do not co-occur with steps that require 
attention to the other task. 
4. Memory. Memory can be divided into two major components: working memory and long-
term memory. Long-term memory holds our store of knowledge. It has no known capacity 
limits. However, our memory for facts and figures (declarative knowledge) is much less 
resilient than our memory for how to do things (procedural knowledge). When not used, 
access to declarative knowledge may be lost. Working memory is a limited capacity 
mental “workbench” in which we can hold and manipulate small amounts of information 
(reliably, only up to 3 propositions). Prospective memory—the memory of the intention to 
do something at a later time—is particularly vulnerable. Deferred items are easily 
forgotten. Procedures must respect the limits of human memory. They should not require 
pilots to remember and/or mentally manipulate more than a few bits of information at any 
time. Memory cues (e.g., do-lists) should be provided for procedures that are rarely 
performed. Procedures should be designed to limit the likelihood of interruptions and 
other events that may lead to deferred actions. When these are unavoidable, checklists 
should be provided for critical items to catch prospective memory failures. 
5. Comprehension. Comprehension refers to understanding the meaning of what we perceive 
and remember. Information may be accurately perceived and/or remembered but 
misinterpreted. When this is reasonably likely (e.g., smoke in the cockpit), procedural 
support should be provided (e.g., a branching problem identification flow chart) to help 
the pilots interpret the perceived information. 
6. Emotion. Emotions are complex psychophysiological processes. Different emotions are 
associated with different psychophysiological responses that may adversely affect 
cognitive processing in different ways. Though difficult to predict, people’s potential 
emotional responses should be taken into account when designing procedures. For 
example, anxiety may lead to narrowed attention and decreased working memory 
capacity. If a procedure (e.g., an emergency procedure) may need to be executed while the 
pilots are likely to be anxious, it should not require that the pilots perform complex mental 
calculations (e.g., procedures should be designed so that no individual step relies heavily 
on working memory).  
Higher-order processes: 
7. Situational awareness. Situational awareness is commonly divided into three levels: 1) the 
perception of critical elements in the environment; 2) the comprehension of their meaning; 
and 3) the projection of their status into the future. Maintaining situational awareness 
depends on attention and working memory. When these processes are impaired, 
situational awareness will be impaired. Whenever continual situational awareness is 
critical (e.g., during taxi), procedures should not require that the pilots devote their 
attention to other tasks (e.g., conducting another procedure). 
8. Problem solving. Many procedures are designed to assist people in finding solutions to 
specific problems. In normal procedures, one can often delineate the order of tasks and the 
specific steps that must be taken to solve the problems (e.g., weight and balance, V-
speeds, fuel required, top-of-descent points). Procedures should provide guidance for 
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determining what the problem is (e.g., determining whether smoke is the result of air 
conditioning or electrical fire), and general approaches to solving these problems. 
9. Decision-making. Decision-making refers to the process of generating, evaluating, and 
selecting between alternative courses of action. Procedures can guide pilots in determining 
what information to consider and how it should be integrated to arrive at a decision. For 
example, a cold weather operations procedure could include steps that would guide pilots’ 
information gathering and decisions regarding the feasibility of departing given the 
weather conditions and the likely delay between de-icing and takeoff. 
10. Task management. Pilots often must perform a number of different tasks within the same 
time period. Procedures can assist pilots in task management by directing the distribution 
of tasks during the flight, and by guiding the pilot in choosing appropriate strategies for 
managing tasks when the workload is high. For example, rather than using a floating 
“before takeoff” checklist to be performed somewhere between the gate and the runway, 
the items on the checklist can be divided between “before taxi” and “at the line” 
checklists, thus managing the workload and avoiding potential conflicts between the need 
to perform all of the items and other duties (e.g., taxi). 
Inter-individual processes: 
11. Communication. Communication requires that thoughts be translated into spoken or 
written (typed) words that are then transmitted to someone else. The “receiver” must then 
decode the message to comprehend what the sender intended to communicate. Problems 
can occur at any step in this process. Procedures should be designed to reduce the 
likelihood of communication errors. For example, when critical information is being 
communicated, standardized language may be required; sterile cockpit rules may be 
applied; and readback and verification steps may be included in the procedure. 
12. Shared mental models. With an accurate shared mental model, a crew can work together 
efficiently with minimal effort. Without a shared mental model, communication and 
coordination may be difficult. Whenever having a shared mental model is particularly 
important, procedures can be designed to ensure that critical information is shared. For 
example, departure and approach briefing procedures can specify what information (e.g., 
intended approach, speeds, and configuration) must always be explicitly communicated.  
13. Roles. In the commercial aviation cockpit there are usually two crosscutting role 
structures: one fairly stable and based on rank (Captain, First Officer) and the second 
transitory and based on the tasks at hand (Pilot Flying, Pilot Not Flying/Pilot 
Monitoring). Procedures that clarify the different duties and decision-making authority 
that are active while the procedure is being conducted allow the work to be easily 
coordinated and avoid potential conflicts.  
14. Culture. The effect of culture (whether national, ethnic, or organizational) is pervasive 
primarily because it strongly affects our mental models, which in turn affect how we 
interpret new information and make sense of the world. Culture can influence our 
perception of what is happening, and our expectations about what will happen and what 
should happen. Procedures should be written with an eye towards avoiding reliance on 
cultural assumptions that may not be shared by all pilots. For example, following a 
merger, pilots from different organizational cultures often are required to operate 
together. If their expectations differ (e.g., whether the FO must wait for the Captain to 
initiate procedures or whether FOs have the responsibility to initiate procedures on their 
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own), dangerous situations can occur (e.g., the FO waiting for the Captain while the 
Captain wonders why the FO is not conducting a procedure). A procedure that clearly 
specifies who will initiate the procedure can avoid this problem. 
 
Analyzing the effects of human factors on an operation involves answering three questions: 
1. What human factors processes are most relevant in performing this particular part of the 
operation? 
2. What are the constraints imposed by each of these factors?  
3. How do these constraints affect the operation? 
 
Task Analysis Tool 
At this point in the task analysis, the development team should have the information required to link 
the requirements of the mission to the constraints imposed by the operational environment and the 
capabilities and limitations of the technology and human pilots. One way to do this is by using a 
simple table or spreadsheet as demonstrated in Figure 1. In each cell, the imposed constraints, 
observed problems, and potential solutions can be detailed. 
 
Time Task Environment Technology Humans 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
Figure 1. Simple Aviation Task Analysis Tool template. 
 
 
This basic framework can be expanded as necessary to encompass multiple components within the 
technology, human, and environment categories and it can be used for both task and phase 
procedures (see Figure 2). It is also possible to use Captain and FO if more relevant than PF/PM, 
or add separate columns for possible errors by each crewmember (see Developing Procedures 
section below). 
 
Time Task Environment Technology Humans 
  Physical Support Regulatory Engines Control Guidance Pilot Flying 
Pilot 
Monitoring 
          
          
          
          
          
          
Figure 2. Expanded Aviation Task Analysis Tool template. 
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When multiple phases must be considered, the structure will become cumbersome unless different 
phases are described on separate sheets (see Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. Aviation Task Analysis Tool by phase of flight. 
 
 
These tools are designed to assist in the conduct and documentation of the systematic task analysis. 
But it is the task analysis not the tool that is important. Only by examining the requirements of the 
mission in the context of the constraints placed on the operation by the requirements of the 
technology, the demands of the operational environment, and the limitations of the human pilots can 
developers be reasonably confident in their understanding of the circumstances that the procedures 
are meant to address. 
 
2.4  Step 4: Crafting Procedural Solutions 
Once the goals of the procedure are clear and the constraints and requirements imposed by the 
technology, humans, and operational environment have been determined from the task analysis, the 
process of constructing the procedure can begin. A general approach to the development of 
procedures is described here divided into five sections. To be effective, all procedures must satisfy 
several requirements. Therefore, the first section details the requirements for effective procedures. 
One of the requirements is that the procedures be consistent with other procedures and with existing 
company policies as well as the overall company operational philosophy. Thus, the second section 
outlines the 4Ps framework of Practice, Procedures, Policies, and Philosophy. The third section 
describes the general structure of procedures. In the fourth section, the process of constructing 
procedures is detailed. Because checklists are a special type of procedure and fulfill a specific and 
important role in aviation, the final section is devoted to the construction of checklists. 
 
2.4.1  Requirements for Procedures 
Procedures are developed to accomplish specific tasks. The primary requirement for any procedure 
is that it be correct. That is, it must produce the outcome that it was designed to produce. 
Furthermore, the procedure should be reliable. Under normal conditions, the procedure should 
always produce the desired outcome every time the actions demanded by the procedure are executed. 
Also, the procedure should be robust. It should be usable across a reasonably broad range of 
circumstances. In addition, the procedure should be resilient. Things don’t always go as planned. 
Technical glitches may occur; people may make mistakes; the operational environment may change. 
Procedures should be resilient enough so that minor faults, errors, or unexpected departures from 
expected conditions can be easily overcome and the desired outcomes achieved. 
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2.4.1.1  Primary Requirement 
Thus, every procedure has a primary requirement: procedures must be: 
Correct. If the procedure is followed, the specified actions will yield the desired outcome. 
 
2.4.1.2  Basic Requirements 
In addition, procedures have three basic requirements:  
Reliable. Under normal conditions, whenever the specified actions are accomplished, the 
desired outcome will be obtained. For a procedure to be reliable, it should minimize 
dependencies on unpredictable or uncontrollable agents and events. Some dependencies 
cannot be avoided, such as depending on dispatch for the release or for weight and balance 
information, or depending on baggage handlers to load the aircraft and close the cargo doors. 
But procedures that contain such dependencies are less reliable than procedures that are fully 
under the control of the crew because steps cannot be incorporated into the cockpit procedure 
that will ensure that these actions are performed properly and finished when needed. 
Similarly, procedures that rely on retrieving a long list of actions from memory are less 
reliable than procedures that do not rely heavily on memory.  
Robust. The procedure will succeed in achieving the desired outcome despite minor expected 
variations in the performance of the equipment, the actions of the human operators, or in the 
operational environment. Thus, a procedure that requires shutting down the APU before 
every takeoff is less robust than a procedure that allows leaving the APU running should that 
be required for passenger comfort during a packs-off maximum-performance takeoff. 
Similarly, a procedure that can only be used during day VMC is less robust than a procedure 
for the same task that can be used under all time and weather conditions.  
Resilient. The procedure will succeed in achieving the desired outcome despite errors or 
unexpected variations. For example, a procedure that includes a step in which the pilot flying 
verifies the pilot monitoring’s input to the FMS before it is executed is more resilient than a 
procedure that lacks this step. The verification step allows errors to be caught and the 
operation to proceed as desired. 
 
A procedure is either correct or not. However, reliability, robustness, and resilience are matters of 
degree. The more reliable, robust, and resilient the procedure, the better the procedure. 
 
2.4.1.3  Subsidiary Criteria 
In addition to the basic requirements above, there are a number of subsidiary criteria that support 
these requirements. These subsidiary criteria are not independent of each other and one criterion may 
need to be traded off against another. Also, the order of priorities among these criteria depends on 
the particular procedure in question. In general, procedures should be: 
Efficient. The execution of the procedure should require the least amount of time and effort 
possible. Inefficient procedures can reduce the available cognitive and other resources that 
may be needed to properly execute the procedure and conduct other activities. It might be 
possible to accomplish a given task in one of several different ways; all ways are equally 
correct and similarly reliable, robust, and resilient but they differ in the amount of time 
required to complete them. The procedure that requires the least amount of time is the most 
efficient procedure. For example, the retraction of flaps after takeoff may be accomplished 
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following a procedure that requires the Pilot Flying to make the callouts for each stage of 
flap retraction and the Pilot Monitoring to execute the actions. Alternatively, the procedure 
could require the Pilot Flying to make the initiating callout and the Pilot Monitoring to 
silently retract the flaps according to the speed schedule and only announce the completion 
of the procedure when the flaps are fully retracted. The second option takes less time and 
attention from the Pilot Flying than the first and is thus more efficient. However, this 
procedure may compromise crew coordination (see the Coordinated criteria described 
below). Trade-offs may be inevitable. 
Useable. The procedure should be “easy” to use. Procedures that rely on easily performed 
actions in easy to follow sequences and utilize well-learned cognitive associations are 
perceived to be “natural” or “intuitive” and are less likely to result in errors. For instance, 
flows that are based on the spatial organization of the cockpit, such as the procedures 
typically used during preflight to confirm the status of aircraft systems, are more usable than 
flows that lack organizational cues.  
Coordinated. To complete the designated task, some procedures require the actions of more 
than one individual. In these cases, the procedures should incorporate steps that ensure 
adequate coordination (e.g., good communication, shared information and mental models) 
between the individuals involved. What’s more, procedures that support CRM are better 
than procedures that ignore CRM. Thus, a procedure that includes both crewmembers is 
preferred over a procedure that leaves one crewmember out of the loop. When the workload 
must be divided between the crewmembers such that each must act independently, 
coordinating steps should be used to periodically bring both crewmembers up-to-date on the 
state of the aircraft and the state of the mission. For example, if the First Officer must go 
“heads down” during taxi to program an amended departure clearance, upon completion of 
the programming task the Captain should brief the FO on the progress of the taxi and any 
ATC communications, and the FO should confirm with the Captain that the programming 
task was performed correctly. 
Integrated. Procedures should be well integrated into the workflow. Individual procedures 
rarely exist in isolation. The individuals charged with executing the procedure may be 
engaged in other activities. The procedure may require interactions between the flight crew 
and cabin crew, ground personnel, or air traffic control. The equipment needed to execute the 
procedure may be needed for other tasks. Hence, although a procedure may be correct and 
reliable in isolation, it may fail if it is not integrated with the other demands placed on the 
technology, humans, and operational environment. For example, a procedure that requires the 
crew to confirm that all cargo doors are properly locked during the preflight walk-around 
isn’t well integrated with the reality of loading late bags.  
Consistent. Individual procedures should be consistent with other procedures and with the 
relevant policies and overall operational philosophy. For instance, procedures should be clear 
and consistent in the allocation of responsibilities and authority, in structure, and in 
phraseology. Inconsistency leads to procedural deviations including intentional and 
unintentional non-compliance. For example, if one procedure requires the Captain to always 
be in control of the aircraft during taxi, it would be inconsistent to have another procedure 
that requires the Captain to make all changes to the programmed route. Similarly, if one 
checklist procedure requires the PM to read the challenge and the PF to respond, it will be 
inconsistent to have another checklist procedure that requires the PF to read the challenge 
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and the PM to respond. One way to encourage consistency across procedures is to have 
policies and an operational philosophy in place to guide procedure development. 
Trainable. Procedures should be easy to train. For instance, a procedure that includes several 
simple steps is easier to train than a procedure that includes complicated steps even if there 
are fewer of them. Also, procedural sequences that lend themselves to a logical story-like 
progression of steps are easier to train than sequences that seem arbitrary. For instance, 
configuring several systems, one system at a time according to the functional dependencies 
within each system is a sequence that would be easier to learn than configuring these systems 
in parallel one step at a time. Although a procedure once learned, may comply with all of the 
other criteria, if the procedure is difficult to learn, training the procedure will put a strain on 
the individuals tasked with performing the procedure and on the organization. 
Adaptable. Procedures should be able to be adaptable to foreseeable changes in technology, 
people, and the operational environment. As changes in the technology, pilot population, and 
operational environment occur, changes to the procedures may become necessary. Less 
disruption to the operation will occur if the procedures in use are designed so that they can be 
easily adapted to changes than if new procedures must be developed, trained, and 
implemented. For instance, procedures that are structured around conceptual steps or 
functions are more adaptable than procedures that are structured around the specific actions 
required to operate a given technology.  
 
2.4.2  Practice, Procedures, Policies, and Philosophy—the 4Ps 
Procedures provide a powerful means of guiding what pilots do in daily line operations. 
However, procedures cannot be written for all situations. Not all situations can be anticipated 
and procedures cannot be written for unanticipated situations. But procedures are not the only 
means of providing guidance. Policies can be developed that can guide pilots when procedures 
are unavailable, or when existing procedures are inappropriate for the situation. Furthermore, 
individual procedures do not exist in isolation, and so policies also assist in the development of a 
coherent system of procedures. Inconsistencies between procedures can make them difficult to 
learn and remember, and are likely to breed noncompliance. Beyond policies, the organization’s 
philosophy provides an overall framework for the system of policies and procedures that 
encourages consistency and provides direction for developing policies and procedures, and 
guidance for pilots when policies and procedures do not address a given situation. The 4Ps 
framework provides a systematic way of thinking about the relations between practice, 
procedures, policies, and philosophy. 
1. Practice. Practice is what happens on the line. It includes all of the decisions that flight 
crews make and all of the actions that they take during flight operations. Practice is what 
is recorded in FOQA and ASAP data, and what is observed during line checks and LOSA. 
It is the reality of the operation. 
2. Procedures. It is often believed that all practices should follow prescribed company SOPs. 
That is not possible. Procedures assume a specific set of conditions, but airline operations 
are conducted in a dynamic environment. In this environment, not all situations can be 
anticipated such that a procedure could be written for them. Some situations must be left 
to situation-specific judgment. Furthermore, some activities for which procedures could be 
developed can be left to “technique” (personal choice or recommended practice). 
Prescribing procedures when they are not needed can lead to resentment and to resignation 
such that when a situation arises for which there is no procedure, people refuse to act on 
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their own initiative. Furthermore, “overproceduralization” can make it difficult for pilots 
to learn and remember all of the mandated procedures.  
3. Policies. While procedures address specific situations and dictate specific actions, policies 
are put in place to cover a broad range of situations, and to provide guidance for decision-
making and action in those cases in which practices must fall outside of existing 
procedures. Policies are also set to guide and limit general behaviors (e.g., a uniform 
policy), the way procedures should be conducted (e.g., checklists will be called for by the 
Captain on the ground, and by the Pilot Flying in the air), or the general ways in which 
equipment should be used (e.g., automation policy). 
4. Philosophy. Policies are limited too. The dynamic, and at times unpredictable, nature of 
the operation may lead a flight crew to find itself in a situation for which no specific 
procedure exists and for which no broad policy applies. In such cases, the crew’s decisions 
and actions must be guided by the operator’s overall operational philosophy. 
 
An operational philosophy is a statement of values. It explicitly articulates the operator’s core 
beliefs. Because values might be in conflict at times (such as safety and on-time performance), the 
philosophy statement sets a clear order of priorities that must apply under all conditions (e.g., it’s 
always more important to be safe than to be on time). When the order of priority among conflicting 
values depends on the operational context, that guidance is set in policies. While the philosophy 
applies universally, each policy applies to a particular set of conditions.  
 
Selecting the situations for which procedures are necessary must be done judiciously. Specific 
procedures are required in situations for which there is only one acceptable way to carry out the 
task. These are situations in which the risk of variability in performance is too large for the 
operator to accept. For example, during an ILS approach, the aircraft must be on the glide slope 
beam and on the localizer beam. It is not acceptable to be anywhere else. Thus, the procedure 
specifies that any substantial deviation must trigger a go-around. At the same time, the crew is 
given some discretionary space with respect to the landing configuration. It is allowable to land 
with different flap settings, depending on a number of variables, and it is possible to extend the 
landing gear at different points in time depending on the energy state of the aircraft. The 
discretionary space is bounded such that the aircraft must be properly configured by a specific 
point on the approach. If the aircraft is not properly configured by that point, a go-around must be 
initiated per procedure. The discretionary space may also be bounded by policy and philosophy. 
For example, a policy may encourage crews to be efficient and not waste time and fuel by 
configuring the aircraft far in advance of the landing. But when the crew is uncomfortable with a 
wet runway and/or crosswind, the fact that a go-around means a late arrival, increased fuel 
consumption, and other costs may be irrelevant because the operational philosophy clearly places 
safety above efficiency and above on time performance. 
 
A clearly articulated philosophy provides guidance for the development of policies, which in turn 
provide guidance for the development of procedures. Procedures dictate the practice in those 
situations for which there is only one acceptable way to perform the task. Policies guide the practice 
in those situations that fall outside of procedures. Philosophy guides the practice in those situations 
that fall outside of policy. When the philosophy, policies, and procedures are clear, coherent, 
consistent, and comprehensive, practice is well guided and compliance is likely. 
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2.4.3  Structure of Procedures 
Procedures are used to accomplish tasks; e.g., start an engine, taxi, or take off. However, several 
different tasks may need to be accomplished at the same time or in close temporal proximity. In this 
case, the steps required to complete the individual tasks may be interleaved, thus combining several 
task procedures into a single superordinate or phase procedure. Sometimes the same label is used to 
refer to both a task and a phase procedure. For example, “taxi procedure” may refer to either the 
procedures used to taxi the aircraft—the “taxi task procedure”—or to all of the tasks that pilots may 
need to accomplish while the aircraft is being taxied—the “taxi phase procedure.” The issues 
involved in sequencing steps between task procedures to create a phase procedure are discussed 
briefly later in this section. The early part of this section focuses on the structure of task procedures. 
 
A well-designed procedure aids flight crews by specifying a sequence of actions that if followed 
ensures that the primary task will be carried out in a manner that meets the abovementioned 
requirements for procedures. In general, good procedures specify 5 elements (not necessarily in 
this order):  
1. What the procedure is designed to accomplish. 
2. When and/or under what conditions the procedure should be executed. 
3. Who is responsible for executing each step in the procedure. 
4. How, in detail, the procedure is to be performed. 
5. How to confirm that the procedure has been accomplished properly. 
 
The procedure developer should be able to specify these elements for each step in the procedure. 
However, it may be possible to simplify the content of the steps when one or more of these elements 
are consistent across the steps. For example, if a single crewmember is responsible for completing 
the entire procedure, it is not necessary to specify at each step that that crewmember will complete 
the step. Similarly, if each step should be completed immediately following the completion of the 
previous step, this need not be specified at each step. For example, “Following completion of the 
after-start procedure and prior to beginning taxi {when}, the Captain {who} will call for the Before 
Taxi checklist {what}.” 
  
Problems may arise if any of the elements of the procedure are not properly specified. For example, 
for braking and ground steering to operate properly, it may be necessary for a hydraulic system to be 
pressurized. Hence, the procedure may specify: “Set hydraulic pump switch to ‘on’ prior to taxi.” 
However, it may take some time for the system to become pressurized. Simply setting the switch to 
“on” does not guarantee that there will be sufficient pressure in the system. Indeed, setting the 
switch to “on” does not even guarantee that the pump is operating. In this case, the proper condition 
for performing the “taxi” step (hydraulic system pressurized—a verification step; more about types 
of steps below) was not specified. Furthermore, when adding the verification step to the procedure, 
the developer may need to specify how the verification should be accomplished (e.g., confirming 
that there is a particular value on a particular display). In addition, who is to perform each step 
should be specified. In some cases, there may be a clear advantage to having one member of the 
crew rather than the other perform a particular step (e.g., the switch is located on one side of the 
cockpit; the FO is busy programming the FMS).  
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2.4.3.1  Procedure Goals 
Every task procedure is composed of one or more steps in a particular sequence. These steps may 
serve to further the primary task objective (e.g., start the engines) or to support a secondary goal, 
typically either to prevent a dangerous or destructive state from occurring or to encourage optimal 
operation (e.g., safe, efficient, reliable, robust). 
 
Typically, the primary goal of a procedure is to accomplish a particular task or set of tasks in 
accordance with specified priorities. For example, the goal of the “engine start” procedure is 
obviously to start the engines. However, company policies may dictate that all procedures should be 
carried out as quickly, efficiently, and safely as possible. Hence, for this company, the goal of the 
engine start procedure would be to start the engines as quickly, efficiently, and safely as possible. 
These secondary goals may require tradeoffs. For example, safety is generally regarded to be more 
important than speed of execution. 
 
2.4.3.2  Margins, Barriers, and Buffers 
To avoid entering unacceptable states, procedure developers can use a combination of procedural 
margins, barriers, and buffers. By using these tools, procedures can be made resilient and robust. 
Like physical barriers, procedural barriers are used to prevent undesirable actions. Margins are used 
to create some space prior to reaching the barrier, and buffers are used to avoid or reduce damage in 
case both the margins and the barrier are breached. 
 
Stabilized approach criteria are a good example of margins. The go-around gate is the barrier; if the 
approach does not meet all the criteria by the specified altitude, a go-around must be initiated. The 
go-around gate is set at an altitude above the runway that provides a buffer such that if a go-around 
isn’t initiated correctly, there is still time to initiate it before contact with the ground. 
 
In general, procedural margins are designed to provide the time, space, and other resources needed 
to execute actions that will allow crews to avoid damaging states. The limits of margins may be 
defined by points in time, positions in space, or particular values on other dimensions (e.g., airspeed, 
temperature, N1/EPR/RPM). For example, an approach procedure may provide a speed margin by 
allowing the crew to fly Vref +10/-5. The procedure requires that the crew take ameliorative actions 
should the airspeed decrease below Vref. However, if the airspeed decreases below Vref-5, the 
procedural barrier may require that a go-around be executed. The limits of this margin are defined by 
airspeed and are designed to provide the crew with the time required to recognize and correct a 
potentially dangerous trend before more drastic actions are required when the barrier is reached. 
Furthermore, Vref is computed in such a way, that there is still a buffer between Vref-5 and the 
speed at which the stick shaker is activated. 
 
In some cases, margins and barriers may be defined by multiple factors. For example, the approach 
procedure could require that the crew take ameliorative actions (e.g., increase thrust, decrease pitch) 
if the airspeed decreases below Vref, but that if the airspeed decreases below Vref-5 at any point or 
the airspeed decreases below Vref when the aircraft is below 200' AGL and not in the landing flare, 
then a go-around must be executed. Thus, this margin and its associated barrier are defined by both 
altitude and airspeed. In this case, the barrier prevents entry into a dangerous state not by preventing 
an action, but by preventing a dangerous condition (low airspeed at low altitude) from occurring.  
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The limits of margins should be defined with attention to the constraints imposed by technology, 
human factors, and the operational environment. For example, the aircraft in the above example 
cannot be allowed to descend below an altitude at an airspeed at which it would be difficult for a 
typical crew to have the time required to detect, identify, and recover from the problem using the 
available energy and allowing for the time required for the change in flight path under a wide range 
of conditions.  
 
Procedural buffers are used to mitigate the effects of undesirable states if these states cannot be 
avoided otherwise. When margins and barriers are insufficient to reduce the risk of entry into 
undesirable states to acceptable levels, developers should consider including steps in normal 
procedures that are designed to lessen or channel the effects of the undesirable states should they 
occur. These steps can be used to make the applicable non-normal procedures easier to accomplish 
or more likely to be effective should they be required. For example, a procedure could call for 
starting the APU to provide standby back-up electrical power and pressurization, or setting-up back-
up navigation systems before commencing a challenging approach to reduce the risks should the 
primary systems fail. 
 
2.4.3.3  Types of Steps 
Procedural steps can be classified into different types. Not all types need to appear in every 
procedure, and their specific sequence depends on the particular procedure. The steps in a procedure 
can generally be divided into 8 types: 
1. Information gathering. In many cases, pilots must obtain information before proceeding 
with a task. These steps may involve reading a display or obtaining information from 
other sources (e.g., ATIS, dispatch). Information gathering steps specify where to obtain 
the information and what information to obtain from these sources. 
2. Information processing. These steps may involve integrating the data gathered from 
different sources (e.g., conditions from dispatch with performance values from charts or 
an EFB) and/or performing calculations on the data obtained (e.g., calculating weight and 
balance, V speeds). 
3. Conditional branching. In some situations, the appropriate actions to be taken depend on 
the situation. In these cases, the procedure user may be directed to another procedure or a 
sub-procedure. These steps are generally written in an “if x then do y” format. For 
example, “IF functioning was not restored, THEN GO TO Hard Reboot procedure.” This 
type of step may be more typical of supplemental and non-normal procedures than of 
normal procedures. For example, “IF deicing is required, THEN GO TO Winter 
Operation procedures.” 
4. Decision-making. In some situations, it may not be possible to specify a priori what 
information is needed, or how the information should be combined to arrive at a course of 
action. However, it may be possible to provide a list of acceptable actions and a general 
process for how to decide which action to take. For example, pilots may be told that 
during preflight planning they should obtain information on the presence of visible 
moisture, temperatures aloft, pilot reports, and probabilistic icing forecasts to determine 
whether dangerous icing conditions exist. Based on this information they should take 
appropriate steps to avoid any dangerous icing areas. 
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5. Waiting (timing). In many tasks, there are points at which no action can be taken until a 
specified amount of time passes or a specific event occurs. For example, a procedure may 
call for a pilot to pause after the landing gear switch is operated until lights illuminate 
indicating that all of the gear is down and locked. Another procedure might call for the 
pilot to wait for 30 seconds after activating a pump before operating other equipment to be 
sure that sufficient time has elapsed for the system to become properly pressurized. 
6. Action. Many steps direct the pilot to take particular actions. These steps may identify the 
specific motions required (e.g., move a switch or turn a knob) or they may identify the 
effect that these actions are intended to have (e.g., switch to battery power, pressurize 
system, increase pitch). Specifying the particular motions, when done clearly, removes 
potential ambiguities. Specifying steps in terms of the intended effects allows the same 
procedures to be used with a greater variety of different, but similar, equipment (e.g., 
different variants of the same model of aircraft).  
7. Verification. Some steps may be devoted to ensuring that an action has been taken. For 
example, a procedure may call for a pilot to verify that a switch is set to a particular 
position or that a display indicates that a system is operating. Verification steps should be 
included in a sequence when failure to execute an action would be problematic for later 
steps in the sequence or later in the flight, as in the case of verifying that the stabilizer trim 
has been set for takeoff. Verification steps are important safeguards against the effects of 
interruptions and other distractions. 
8. Validation. Some steps may be devoted to ensuring that a system remains within desired 
parameters or alternately that an undesired state does not occur. Validation is distinct from 
verification. Verification steps ensure only that an action has been taken, not that it has 
had the desired effect. Depending on the system, verifying that a step has been taken and 
validating that it has had the desired effect may occur at very different points in time. For 
example, it takes some time for engine parameters to stabilize following engine start; thus, 
verification that the engine started can be done as soon as the EGT starts rising, but 
validation that the engine is running properly can only be done once all the parameters are 
stable and “in the green.” 
 
2.4.3.4  Phase Procedures 
Phase procedures are created by concatenating or interleaving the steps of several task procedures. 
The interleaving of the steps of task procedures into a phase procedure requires careful assessment 
of the various technology requirements and their interdependencies, of the operational context within 
which the procedure is to be executed, and of the typical vulnerabilities of the human who must 
execute the procedure. In particular, it is critical to minimize the demands for concurrent task 
management and the demands for deferred actions. People are very vulnerable to interruptions and 
distractions under both deferred intentions and concurrent tasks. The risk of omitting procedural 
steps is high under these conditions. For instance, a procedure that mandates that a checklist be 
performed during taxi creates a task concurrent with taxiing the aircraft. So would a procedure that 
must be executed during climb upon reaching 10,000'. Because of the sterile cockpit rule, operators 
may choose to require the crew to make various company reports passing 10,000'; however, in many 
departure environments that altitude is busy with ATC interactions and potentially conflicting traffic 
requiring the crew’s full attention. Forcing the crew to either manage concurrent tasks or else defer 
some tasks for a later time increases the risk of errors. 
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2.4.4  Developing Procedures 
This section provides a general approach to the process of developing procedures. This process has 5 
steps that are iterated when necessary: 
1. Develop a prototype task procedure. 
2. Analyze the prototype task procedure. 
3. Eliminate conflicts. 
4. Develop the phase procedure. 
5. Test the phase procedure. 
 
The results of these steps should be documented for future reference should the procedures need to 
be modified again, for use in training, and for use in seeking approval of the procedures from the 
FAA/POI Office. 
 
2.4.4.1  Develop a Prototype Task Procedure 
Once the goals of the procedure are clear and the constraints and requirements imposed by the 
technology, humans, and operational environment have been determined from the task analysis, a 
prototype procedure can be created by translating the requirements into a sequence of steps that will 
accomplish the primary objective of the procedure (e.g., start the engines) and is correct, reliable, 
robust, and resilient. However, procedure development is an iterative process. The initial draft of a 
procedure may be modified several times before it is completed. Steps may be added, removed, or 
modified and sequences may be altered to accomplish secondary goals. For example, the goal of the 
“engine start” procedure is obviously to start the engines. However, company policies may dictate 
that all procedures should be carried out quickly, safely, and at the lowest cost possible. In this case, 
the procedure developer would aim to design a procedure that is correct, reliable, and robust and that 
can be executed quickly and safely without using resources unnecessarily. Also, the particular 
phrasing of the procedure can be specified at a later point. The goal of the first round is to develop a 
prototype procedure.  
 
As noted in the “Structure of Procedures” section above, good procedures specify 5 elements:  
1. What the procedure is designed to accomplish. 
2. When and/or under what conditions the procedure should be executed. 
3. Who is responsible for executing the procedure. 
4. How, in detail, the procedure is to be performed. 
5. How to know that the procedure has been accomplished properly. 
 
For the prototype, the procedure outline will generally follow (but not always) these 5 elements 
in order. 
 
Procedures always involve technological, human, and environmental factors to some extent; this will 
be reflected in the Task Analysis. In principle, one could start the design process by examining the 
requirements for the task posed by any one of these factors. Logically, there is no reason to prefer 
starting with any particular factor as long as all of the factors are considered. However, developers 
will rarely need to begin from scratch.  
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Frequently, procedure designers will begin with at least a sketch of the task provided by technical 
experts. Hence, the procedure design process frequently begins with the consideration of the 
technological requirements. 
 
For example, to start an engine such as the APU, the engine must be provided with fuel and an 
ignition source. So, fuel must be brought to the engine. This may require the operation of a fuel 
pump. The pump and the ignition system will need a source of power to operate. This will need 
to come from either the ground or an aircraft battery. Hence, without going any further it is clear 
that several actions are required: e.g., “Set battery power on,” “Set pump on,” “Set ignition on,” 
“Set engine to start.” Furthermore, some of these actions may need to be performed in a 
particular sequence. 
 
Similarly, some sequence of actions must be designed to ensure that the area around the engines is 
clear of ground personnel before the procedure is started. In addition, it may be necessary to receive 
permission from a ramp or ground control facility to push the aircraft back from the gate before the 
engines are started. These steps stem from the operational constraints identified in the task analysis. 
They will need to be interwoven with the steps required to meet the technological requirements as 
the timing dictates. In this example, a step such as “Verify with ground crew that the area around the 
engines is clear” may be placed anywhere in the procedure prior to engine start. The timing of other 
actions by the flight or ground crew may dictate a more precise placement in the sequence.  
 
In designing a task procedure, a particular sequence of steps may be required for the entire 
procedure. However, it may be possible for some steps to be performed in any order in which case 
this part of the sequence may be left to the discretion of the pilot. For example, a departure briefing 
procedure may specify a set of critical elements that must be briefed first in sequence to reduce the 
likelihood that that part of the briefing will be interrupted (and critical elements potentially skipped). 
The order in which all other elements are covered may be left for the pilot performing the briefing to 
determine depending on the particular conditions relevant to the flight. 
 
There are several possible sources from which pieces of procedures can be derived and used in 
developing a prototype procedure. These include: 
Manufacturers. Manufacturers of aircraft and equipment generally provide procedures that 
are technologically correct. However, the manufacturer cannot foresee all of the possible 
environments in which the equipment may be used. Manufacturer’s procedures may need to 
be adapted to take into account the particular operational environment and pilot 
characteristics. 
Other airlines. Other airlines may operate in identical or similar operational environments 
using the same or similar equipment and have similar operating policies and philosophy. The 
procedures used by these airlines may provide a useful starting point. In addition, these 
airlines may have data that can be used to identify potential problems and solutions.  
Other fleets within the airline. Other fleets within the airline may operate in similar 
environments and share the company philosophy and relevant policies. The procedures used 
by these fleets may provide another useful starting point. However, there may be important 
differences in operations due to different route structures and the technology used, which will 
need to be taken into account. 
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Pilot techniques and workarounds. The techniques and workarounds used by pilots to make 
existing procedures work can be another useful starting point for developing new procedures 
and/or revising existing procedures. Workarounds may indicate a problem with the existing 
procedure, thus identifying a course of action that should not be duplicated in the new 
procedures. In addition, workarounds may offer a potential solution for a problem. Of course, 
like any step or sequence of steps, these should be properly evaluated (see below) before 
being included in the final procedure. 
FAA Advisory Circulars and other materials. FAA Advisory Circulars and other materials 
may provide relevant guidance. Even if the guidance is not directed at operations with 
identical technology or operational environments as the situation under consideration, the 
guidance may provide insight and inspire other potential solutions. 
 
2.4.4.2  Analyze the Prototype Procedure 
Each step in the proposed new procedure should be scrutinized to uncover any potential conflicts 
with the limitations of the technology, demands of the operational environment, and limitations of 
humans. To conduct this analysis, the sequence of steps that comprise the prototype procedure can 
be entered into a version of the spreadsheet tool used in the task analysis with a column identifying 
the actions to be taken by each crewmember in chronological order (see Figures 1 and 2). Then 
potential conflicts at each step can be examined in sequence. Much of the information required for 
this analysis will be available in the previously developed task analysis (see above). 
 
2.4.4.3  Eliminate Conflicts 
If a conflict is detected, the procedure may be modified to reduce or eliminate the problem. In 
general, one may: (a) alter the timing of individual steps; (b) transfer the responsibility for executing 
individual steps from one crewmember to another; or (c) alter one or more steps. For example, by 
using the enhanced task analysis tool presented in Figure 2, one could detect two conflicts in the 
engine start example discussed previously: given the timeline, the pushback cart and tow bar might 
be connected to the aircraft (Environment), and the Captain might be communicating with the 
pushback crew and so distracted from the task of starting the engine (Human). To reduce these 
conflicts, it is possible to delay engine start until after the pushback crew is released (option A), to 
transfer the responsibility for starting the engines exclusively to the FO (option B), or to prevent 
communication with the pushback crew during the engine start sequence (option C). Choosing 
whom to assign these tasks to should take into account other concurrent tasks. For example, 
assigning the actions of manipulating switches to the First Officer may be acceptable in view of the 
human factors problem caused by dividing attention and the risk it may impose on performance. 
 
When it is impossible to implement any alterations or they prove ineffective, procedure developers 
will need to consider adding steps to the procedure that do not remove the conflict, but only mitigate 
its effects. In general, these additions will work to either: (a) provide additional support for the task 
or (b) provide verification steps to catch errors and recovery steps to mitigate the effects of possible 
errors. For instance, in most situations it is impossible to eliminate all potential interruptions. The 
procedure designer has no control over many such events, as when ATC might issue a call to the 
crew, or when a passenger might suffer a medical emergency. However, a procedure could be put in 
place such that whenever the execution of a checklist is interrupted, the checklist must be re-initiated 
from its beginning (option A). Alternatively, or additionally, safety critical items could be re-
verified. For example, if the procedure for setting the flaps for takeoff might be interrupted (e.g., by 
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an ATC call), or the step deferred (e.g., due to contaminated taxiway conditions), verifying that the 
flaps are properly set could be done directly in the Before Taxi checklist, and verified again by a 
“throttle bump” prior to taking the active runway (option B). In the case of unavoidable deferred 
tasks, as with setting the flaps when deicing is required, the procedure could require the crew to 
repeat the complete Before Taxi checklist following the deicing procedure (option A), even though it 
was already accomplished prior to taxiing to the deicing pad. 
 
When using the tool to analyze the prototype procedure, a column for possible solutions (e.g., 
techniques or work-arounds) can be added to the spreadsheet such that next to each possible conflict, 
a possible solution is listed. These solutions then must undergo the same analysis of possible 
conflicts with the limitations of the technology, demands of the operational environment, and 
limitations of humans. 
 
2.4.4.4  Develop Phase Procedure 
A phase procedure is composed of task procedures placed in a temporal order to ensure that all of 
the tasks that must be performed during a phase of flight are properly completed. The task 
procedures may be concatenated or interwoven. Whenever the steps of the task procedures that 
comprise the phase procedure are interwoven, there is an increased risk of cross-task interference. 
However, interweaving the task procedures may be necessary to accomplish all of the tasks that 
must be completed. For example, during the approach phase, the flight crew must both fly the 
approach and configure the aircraft for landing. 
 
Whenever multiple tasks must be completed together, the procedure developer must ensure that the 
steps required to perform one task do not interfere with the performance of the other tasks. This is 
the primary concern that distinguishes the process of developing phase procedures from the process 
of developing task procedures. In developing task procedures, the developer creates steps that, when 
properly sequenced, accomplish the task and do not violate any of the technological, human factors, 
or operational environment constraints. However, when tasks are interwoven it is possible that the 
new arrangement of actions can create conflicts between these factors that were not previously 
present. Hence, the same process described above of evaluating the sequence of steps for conflicts 
must be accomplished, and if a conflict is detected, the procedure again must be modified to reduce 
or eliminate the problem. As with task procedures, when a conflict is discovered in a phase 
procedure the developer may: a) alter the timing of individual steps or entire tasks within the phase, 
b) transfer the responsibility for executing individual steps or entire tasks from one crewmember to 
another, or c) alter one or more steps in the individual task procedures.  
 
And as with the task procedures, when it is impossible to implement any of these alterations or they 
prove ineffective, one may be forced to add steps to the phase procedure that do not remove the 
conflict, but only mitigate its effects. In general, these modifications will work to either: (a) provide 
additional support for one or more of the tasks included in the phase procedure or (b) provide 
verification steps (e.g., checklist items) to catch and recover from errors.  
 
For example, under low-visibility weather conditions there are often delays, which provide an 
opportunity for substantial fuel savings by not running all engines during the long taxi time. 
However, when trying to save fuel by taxiing for departure on a single engine, a procedure must be 
developed to start the other engine(s) prior to take off. Attempting to start an engine while taxiing 
carries particular risks. To mitigate such risks, single-engine taxi procedures may add a step, calling 
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for a confirmation of “all engine indications in the green” prior to taking the runway. The conflict 
between the demands of the taxi procedure and the engine start procedure are still there, but some of 
the effects of that conflict are mitigated by the added step. 
 
Using the Aviation Task Analysis Tool in procedure development. At this point in the procedure 
development process, the actions required to fulfill the mission must be identified and allocated 
to the crewmembers while taking into account the constraints imposed by the requirements of 
the technology, the demands of the operational environment, and the limitations of the human 
pilots. The Aviation Task Analysis Tool can be adapted for this purpose. In Figure 4, the 
information obtained from the task analysis is displayed (shaded columns) together with several 
additional columns.  
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Figure 4. Aviation Task Analysis Tool. 
 
 
Time runs along the vertical axis. The left-hand half of the table is focused on the Captain; the right-
hand side is focused on the First Officer. Depending on the operation, these headers could be used to 
identify the Pilot Flying and Pilot Monitoring instead. Each step in the procedure is noted on the 
center columns marked “Step/Activity.” Steps performed by the Captain are noted on the left, while 
steps performed by the First Officer are noted on the right. Then the technological, human, and 
environmental factors that influence each step are noted on the left or right halves of the table, 
depending on which crewmember is affected. Finally, potential problems and other comments are 
listed. Multiple simultaneous activities can be tracked by noting when each step starts and stops on a 
different line.  
 
This structure can be used at different levels of granularity. The more specific the action list, the 
finer grain the analysis and the more precise the result. Thus, if the action listed is “perform preflight 
flow,” the level of granularity will be very different from the level of granularity available if every 
item on that flow is listed separately. It may be possible to determine the most useful level of 
granularity in advance. However, usually it’s easier to start with the finest grain first and later 
combine rows if the fine-grain analysis proves to be too detailed, than to start with a coarse grain and 
later realize that a finer grain analysis is needed. 
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For example, to determine where to place items that must be checked prior to takeoff (e.g., flap 
setting), the procedure developer can examine the period between engine start5 and arrival at the 
runway threshold. One option would be to place these items on a taxi checklist. However, during this 
period there would be two potential conflicts: (1) during taxi, both pilots need to attend to signs, 
taxiway and runway markings, ground vehicles, and other aircraft (operational demand for both 
pilots) and they cannot do so effectively (human limitation) while completing the checklist, and (2) 
ATC may issue additional instructions (operational demand) that could interrupt the checklist and 
create a prospective memory problem, or be missed because the crew is focused on the checklist 
procedure (human limitations). The procedure developer could then “slide” the checklist in the tool 
to different time periods before or after taxi to find a point during which conflicts are minimized. 
 
2.4.4.5 Test Procedure 
The analysis of the proposed procedure provides the basis for the first round of changes to the 
prototype procedure. Once it is clear that the prototype procedure has properly addressed all the 
concerns raised in the analytical process and that all possible conflicts have been addressed, the 
phase procedure should be tested for feasibility and practicality.  
 
Feasibility testing. Feasibility testing may be performed by pilots involved in the development of the 
procedure. These pilots should attempt to enact the phase of flight in which the procedure is to be 
used under a variety of conditions. These conditions should include a variety of routine challenges—
such as ATC calls, weather issues, airport constraints, calls from the cabin—and non-routine 
challenges that might be relevant. Feasibility testing is aimed at determining whether the procedure 
is sufficiently reliable and robust under the operational conditions that will be encountered. This 
testing too is an iterative process: any time a problem is identified, the procedure must be revised to 
address that problem, and then tested again to make sure the revision did not create new problems. 
Initially, this testing may be performed in a procedure trainer or even as “armchair flying.” 
However, the procedure should eventually be tested in a fully functional flight simulator. 
 
Practicality testing. If the procedure passes feasibility testing by the procedure developers, the 
process should be repeated in a full mission flight simulator using line pilots not involved in the 
development process. Again, this testing should include a variety of routine and non-routine 
challenges. These pilots should have received only the training that will be made available to all line 
pilots once the procedures have been approved. The purpose of this practicality testing is to 
determine whether it is indeed practical to implement the procedures across the fleet or the airline.  
 
If the procedure passes the feasibility testing but not the practicality testing it may be possible to 
improve performance by modifying either the procedure or the training. For example, pilots familiar 
with the procedure may have developed techniques that allow them to perform the procedure 
appropriately under conditions that confound line pilots. It may be possible to incorporate these 
techniques into the procedures. Alternatively, it may be necessary to provide line pilots with 
additional or different training that allows them to build the procedural knowledge that the pilots 
involved in the development of the procedures possess. 
 
  
                                                
5 This is a technology limitation. Setting flaps requires hydraulic pressure, which is only available after the 
engines are started. 
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2.4.5  Developing Checklists 
Checklists are a special type of procedure. Checklists are often considered the prototypical example 
of procedures. They are often the form into which extended procedures are distilled, and often the 
most common and most frequent form through which people interact with formal procedures. On the 
flight deck, checklists are important tools for making sure that the work is done correctly. 
 
This section is focused on checklists because of their special status among phase procedures. Like 
any procedure, once a prototype checklist has been developed, it must be subjected to the analysis 
step using the same tools and methodology described above. All potential conflicts must be 
addressed, and the checklist must be thoroughly tested for feasibility and practicality. In addition to 
the design of the list itself, the checklist procedure—the manner in which the checklist is to be 
executed—must be designed, analyzed for possible conflicts, and tested. 
 
Although all airplanes come with the manufacturer’s checklist, the manufacturer is only required to 
furnish operating procedures (14CFR 25.1585) in the form of an Airplane Flight Manual (14CFR 
25.1581). Thus, the true responsibility for the checklist lies with the airline (14CFR 121.315), not 
with the manufacturer. Manufacturers know a great deal about the technology and the engineering 
requirements for operating the aircraft, but the manufacturer is not an operator and thus has only 
indirect knowledge of the operational environment and the particular skills, training, and experience 
of an airline’s pilots. Therefore, operators may need to modify manufacturers’ checklists to fully 
meet their own needs. 
 
Because it is unlikely that an operator would have to design the full set of flight checklists from 
scratch, it is assumed here that the task at hand involves the revision of an existing checklist, or the 
creation of a new checklist to address a particular kind of operation (e.g., RNP), or a particular new 
piece of equipment (e.g., a HUD). Moreover, given the extensive experience in the industry with 
checklists, even manufacturers that produce a new model of an aircraft do not start the checklist 
design as if it’s the very first time a cockpit checklist has to be designed. Thus, a general discussion 
of normal checklists and their phase-of-flight organization is not included here. 
 
In the most general sense, any list can be construed as a “checklist,” especially any list in which 
items get “checked off” as they are accomplished. Some such lists are “do-lists.” That is, the items 
on the list describe actions, and the person executing the list looks at an item, performs it, then looks 
at the next item and performs it, and so on until all items are done. On the flight deck, abnormal and 
emergency procedures are often performed using a checklist as a do-list. Such a do-list must contain 
all the actions to be performed. For most normal procedures on the flight deck, the checklist is used 
to check and verify that actions that should have already been done were indeed done correctly. This 
procedure assumes that a “flow” (i.e., a sequence of actions done from memory to configure the 
aircraft and its systems) was conducted, and that the flow is followed by a checklist containing 
selected items that can be used to confirm that the entire flow was performed correctly.  
 
Designing good checklists and good checklist procedures involves considering and determining the 
following 11 aspects: 
01. Consistency. The checklist, as an integral part of the system of procedures, must be 
consistent with that system, which in turn must be consistent with relevant policies, 
which in turn must be consistent with the overall operational philosophy. In other words, 
when it comes to designing a checklist, even when only tasked with assessing the 
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introduction of a single checklist item into an existing checklist, the company’s 
operational philosophy and the policies which are relevant to procedures and to checklists 
should first be reviewed to ensure consistency. Questions about which items should be on 
a checklist, how to accommodate different types of operations, and how lists should be 
standardized should not be resolved on a checklist-by-checklist basis. For consistency, 
these issues must be addressed in a checklist policy and applied uniformly. 
02. Type of list and manner of execution. A do-list is often executed in a “read-and-do” 
fashion, whereas a check-list is often executed in a “challenge-response” fashion. Either 
type list and either manner of execution can be performed by a single pilot or by both 
crew members. When the checklist is performed by a single pilot, it can either be 
performed silently, or aloud. As always, there are trade-offs that must be considered in 
making these choices. A do-list is usually longer than a check-list, and may be 
significantly longer. Performing the checklist silently, leaves the other pilot out of the 
loop and forgoes an important safety-mechanism built into the checklist procedure. 
Involving both crewmembers in the performance of the checklist contributes to the 
coordination between them, and to the creation of a shared mental model. However, in 
non-normal situations and under time pressure, it might be better to divide the workload 
such that one pilot is focused on flying the aircraft and is perhaps involved in 
coordinating with ATC, the cabin, and dispatch, while the other pilot performs the 
checklist. Also, because normal operations are conducted very often and entail many 
repetitions, flows can be trusted to memory such that the checklist can be used as a 
check-list. Because non-normal procedures are performed very rarely (usually only 
during training) and because of the potential criticality of their execution, nothing should 
be trusted to memory; the checklist must be used as a do-list. 
03. Timing. During normal operations, most checklists are designed to ascertain that the 
aircraft is properly configured and ready for the next phase of flight. Hence, checklist 
titles often start with the word “before,” as in “before engine start,” “before takeoff,” and 
“before landing.” Also, if the list is used as a check-list, the checklist procedure should be 
initiated after the preparation of the aircraft for the next phase is completed. 
Given the criticality of the checklist procedure, the crew’s ability to pay full attention to 
its execution is crucial. The timing of the checklist must be such that it would minimize 
the risk of interruptions, distractions, and concurrent tasks. For example, a “Taxi 
Checklist” that is to be accomplished during taxi might appear as an efficient use of crew 
time, but it creates a high risk situation because the crew cannot pay full attention to both 
the taxi and the checklist. Thus, to determine an appropriate time for the checklist, a 
thorough understanding of the operational context within which the checklist will be used 
is necessary. This understanding can be used to identify possible “pause points,” short 
time periods when other activities can be suspended long enough to execute the checklist 
without interruption. 
If the analysis of the operational environment suggests that there may not be enough time 
for a reasonably paced and deliberate execution of the checklist, it might be possible to 
re-design the checklist such that some of the items from that list can be performed at a 
different time, and only the absolutely necessary items left for that short pause point. For 
example, most of the actions necessary to configure the aircraft for takeoff can be done 
prior to taxi. The time point at which the pushback crew is released, the engines are 
running, and the parking brake is still set is completely under the control of the crew. 
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This is an excellent pause point; even if the flight is delayed, or other aircraft are queuing 
for the ramp, the operation is under the control of the flight crew. It is much harder to 
pause the operation at the hold-short line. Thus, it is better to have a long Before Taxi 
checklist and a very short Before Takeoff Checklist than the other way around. 
04. Roles. The role of providing the right cue at the right time for initiating the checklist is 
always assigned to one of the two pilots—usually, the Captain on the ground and the 
Pilot Flying in the air. The cue comes in the form of a verbal call (e.g., “Before Start 
checklist!”), and serves to prompt the other pilot to retrieve the checklist (i.e., if using a 
paper checklist, to pull it out from its storage position; if using an electronic checklist to 
scroll to or bring up the correct screen). If the checklist is for normal operations, is a 
check-list rather than a do-list, and involves both crew members in a challenge-response 
interaction, both pilots would then be expected to direct their attention to the checklist 
task. The pilot responsible for leading the checklist begins by calling out (or 
“challenging”) the first item on the list. The other pilot determines whether the item has 
been performed correctly and provides the relevant response (see discussion of 
phraseology below). There are several variations on the theme of the challenge-response 
method. Following the response of the responding pilot, the challenging pilot may: (1) 
immediately go on to challenge the next item, or (2) independently verify the state of the 
item before going on to the next item. The verification may or may not involve specific 
gestures such as pointing to the relevant switch, lever, or indication. If the item is 
independently verified, the challenging pilot may or may not provide a verbal response.  
Given the high tempo of most operations and the large number of repetitions of these 
procedures, there is always the risk that people may go through the words or through the 
motions without actually paying full attention to the process. Thus, it is best to place the 
checklist procedure at an appropriate time, assign the roles, and design a procedure that 
would best support a well-paced and deliberate execution of the checklist. 
05. Initiation anchor. The initiation of a checklist is best anchored to a clear cue that cannot 
be easily removed or obstructed, such as the occurrence of a particular event (e.g., arrival 
at a point 2000 feet prior to the hold-short line may cue the initiation of the Before 
Takeoff checklist). Sometimes, the initiation of a checklist is left open, constrained only 
by a time window (e.g., the Taxi checklist is to be completed anytime during taxi) and/or 
acceptable circumstances (e.g., the checklist is to be completed when both pilots are free 
of other duties). In these cases, pilots may use internal or external cockpit cues to help 
them try to remember to initiate the checklist at the correct time. However, without clear 
anchors, there is a high risk that checklists will not be initiated at the appropriate time. 
Pilots may then rush through the checklist, omit parts of the checklist, or fail to perform 
the checklist altogether. The importance of having clear and reliable external cues to 
trigger the initiation of the checklist procedure at the right time cannot be 
overemphasized. 
 06. Completion signal. The checklist completion signal enhances situation awareness and 
crew coordination by providing tangible evidence that the checklist has been performed 
in its entirety. It also may cue the next procedure or other activities. The most common 
completion cue is a verbal annunciation (e.g., “Before Taxi checklist complete!”) made 
by the pilot who is responsible for leading the execution of the checklist. The completion 
call may be written out as the last line item, or centered under each checklist. When the 
completion call is not explicitly listed on the checklist, pilots must rely on memory or 
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personal technique for signaling the completion of a checklist. A common technique is to 
rely on the gesture of returning the checklist card to its storage place on top of the 
glareshield, or by making a similar gesture in the case of an electronic checklist. 
However, such gestures can be easily missed by the other pilot, and the attempt to create 
a shared situation awareness then fails. A failure to provide a clear checklist completion 
signal removes a layer of redundancy and increases the risk of omissions.  
07. Format. Checklists may be presented in paper or electronic formats. The particular 
format a checklist might take has more to do with the available technology and financial 
resources than with the intended content of the list itself.  
7a. Paper. With paper checklists, the entire set of checklists required for flight may 
be printed on a paper card, which is typically laminated. It is placed in a holder, 
often on the glareshield or on the side of the center pedestal, from which it is 
retrieved and held in the pilot’s hand when he or she wants to execute one of the 
checklists listed on it. Paper checklists are easy to handle both operationally 
during flight and administratively when changes have to be made. The mere act of 
holding a paper checklist card in one’s hand provides a cue for the execution of 
the checklist. However, the paper checklist also presents disadvantages, the main 
one being the lack of a pointer to mark unaccomplished items, or the point at 
which a checklist is interrupted. The need to hold the checklist may also interfere 
with performing other actions. 
7b. Electronic. ECLs can vary from the electronic equivalent of the paper card 
displayed on a tablet computer of some kind (or even a cellphone), all the way to 
an integrated checklist that can be displayed on any of the screens available in the 
cockpit. Fully integrated checklists are connected with aircraft systems as well as 
with the aircraft GPS and FMS. These checklists can be sensitive to the aircraft’s 
state and can be programmed to display automatically at the appropriate times. An 
operator’s ability to modify the ECL depends on the particular ECL (e.g., an 
operator’s produced Class 1 EFB vs. an integrated ECL), the aircraft model, and 
the specific arrangements the operator might have with the manufacturer. 
08. Content. Assuming that the list is used as a check-list rather than a do-list, and that a flow 
is accomplished prior to the initiation of the checklist procedure, the checklist itself need 
only contain two types of items: critical items and representative items. 
8a. Critical items. Critical items are those items whose omission would have a direct 
and severe adverse impact on the safety of the operation; for instance, setting the 
flaps for takeoff. 
8b. Representative items. Representative items are selected items that represent a 
whole subset of flow actions such that if the selected item was performed 
correctly, the whole subset must have also been performed correctly. For instance, 
if all engine indications are in the green, the whole engine start sequence must 
have been done correctly. Therefore, checking the engine indications can serve as 
a representative item for the engine start sequence.  
A single item can be both critical and representative. For instance, confirming the correct 
Vspeeds before takeoff represents a long sequence of FMC programming entries and 
ensures a safe takeoff and obstacle clearance during the initial climb. 
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Sometimes there might be pressure to add an item to the checklist because that item was 
omitted in the past and the omission led to an incident or an accident. In such cases, it is 
critical to carefully analyze the true reasons for the omission. It is often the case that the 
real problem resides elsewhere. Furthermore, although it may seem that repeating an item 
provides greater reliability, when people have in their mind the impression that an action 
has already been done, calling for it again is not likely to change that impression. Thus, 
repeating an item, even under a different task-checklist (e.g., calling for flaps on the 
Before Taxi checklist and again on the Before Takeoff checklist), may not be an effective 
mitigation strategy. A more effective approach than a simple repetition of a line item is 
the inclusion of a different check that serves the same purpose. For instance, setting the 
flaps for takeoff can be part of the After Start flow and confirmed by a line item on the 
Before Taxi checklist, and then confirmed again by a quick advancement and retraction 
of the throttle/thrust lever during the Before Takeoff checklist, using the takeoff 
configuration warning horn to reveal to the crew if the flaps have not been set for takeoff. 
However, technologically based hardware solutions are not a fail-proof cure-all. For 
example, the takeoff configuration warning system has failed in the past (e.g., NWA 255, 
SpanAir 5022), and the throttles may require more than a gentle nudge or even a quick 
forward and back movement to activate the warning system. Also, such a test cannot 
reveal cases in which the flaps are extended, but to a different setting than the one 
required for the specific takeoff (which is also a problem with integrated ECLs). 
09. Item order. If the flow preceding the checklist is carefully designed to take advantage of 
the physical layout of switches, displays and indicators in the cockpit (e.g., going from 
left to right, and/or from top to bottom), to account for the inherent dependencies 
between the systems involved (e.g., electrical system first and only then fuel heat), and is 
built to support human memory (e.g., chunking or clustering related activities together), 
and if the checklist is indeed short, then the internal order of the items on the list can 
simply mirror the sequence of the flow, or of the operation. Such order aids in learning, 
increases ease of use, and avoids dissonance given the flow habits. 
Another possible ordering consideration is item priority. Often, the checklist is called for 
when the workload is low and the probability of interruption is also low. So the first few 
line items of the checklist would have a relatively low probability of being omitted due to 
an interruption. The probability of interruptions and distractions increases with checklist 
length and the time it takes to execute it. Thus, even though checklists mainly contain 
critical items, these could be prioritized, and those with higher importance placed first on 
the checklist.  
10. Length. A checklist should be as long as it needs to be, and as short as possible. An 
airline may choose to set different checklist length policies, depending on the type of 
operation involved. For instance, there are several differences between long-haul and 
short-haul operations with respect to checklist use. Pilots who fly short flight segments 
perform the flight checklists multiple times per day, and many times on a typical trip 
rotation. Therefore, a requirement to conduct a long and detailed checklist for each flight 
phase may lead some to deviate from prescribed procedures. In such cases, the flight 
crews often check only what they perceive to be the critical items (“killer items” as some 
call them). Pilots who are required to use long checklists often express concern about 
poor checklist discipline in short-haul operations. In long-haul operations, the reverse 
occurs. Pilots who fly long routes usually perform the flight checklists only once a day, 
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and very few times, often only twice, per trip rotation. Furthermore, pilots who fly long 
haul operations find themselves flying very few trips per month, and so express little 
resistance to a long and detailed checklist. In fact, these pilots may welcome the support 
it offers. Thus, the airline may choose a policy of short checklists for their short-haul 
operation and of longer and more detailed checklists for their long-haul operation. 
11. Phraseology. As with the phrasing of all procedures, the challenge part of a checklist 
item is best phrased to mirror the label used in the cockpit for the corresponding switch, 
lever, indicator, or system. The response part is best phrased in terms of the actual system 
state, switch or lever position, or the specific parameter value.  
The generic responses of “set,” “checked,” or “as required” may not be very informative 
and do not provide as good an opportunity to confirm correct action as the actual 
indication. Compare, for instance, the response to the challenge “Flaps!” with “set” vs. 
with “position fifteen, indicated fifteen.” The second response provides both the flap 
handle position and the flap indicator indication, confirming that not only the lever has 
been placed in the correct position, but that the intended effect has also occurred, and 
thus providing a complete and accurate description of the state of the flaps. Such an item 
can appear on the checklist with the call “flaps” followed by “position ____, 
indicated_____” to enable the responding crewmember to provide the specific values. 
Similarly, the response to the call “landing gear” prior to landing should be “down, 
locked, 3 greens” communicating the handle position (down) gear status (locked) and the 
down and locked confirmation lights (3 greens). When indications must be compared, for 
instance, the altimeter settings of the two pilots’ instruments must be identical, the 
response to the call for the Altimeters could be “30.01 (observed value), set, cross-
checked.” That response communicates the required altimeter setting (per ATIS or ATC), 
the fact that it is set correctly, and the fact that three different instruments, the Captain’s 
the First Officer’s and the standby all show the same setting. Similarly, printing “as 
required” as a response on the checklist isn’t helpful. The response should be the system 
state. For instance, anti ice may or may not be required. The checklist could list anti ice, 
and leave the response open for the crewmember to say whether it’s ON or OFF. It’s 
possible to elaborate the response: “is/not required and is ON/OFF.” Alternatively, it’s 
possible to list the line item as “if anti ice is required, anti ice…. ON.” Either way, “as 
required” is not an appropriate response on the checklist. Clearly stating the switch 
position, the action taken, or the system state provides all the information needed, 
nothing is extraneous, and there is no ambiguity about it.  
 
2.5  Step 5: Writing Procedures 
Once procedures are developed, they must be communicated and trained effectively. In this section, 
guidelines for the written communication of procedures are presented. These guidelines may apply 
differently, depending on whether the writing is of detailed procedures or of checklists, and on 
whether the writing is for normal or for non-normal procedures/checklists. 
 
2.5.1  General Guidelines 
1. Include only the information needed to understand how to execute the procedure. It is important 
to communicate the rationale underlying procedures as well as the rationale for not implementing 
other possible solutions. It is also useful to communicate the procedure development process to 
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establish its validity and effectiveness. However, this information should be provided in a 
separate training manual or other documents. 
 
2. Include supplemental detail only when necessary. Avoid clutter. When the addition of 
supplemental information is necessary, separate the supplemental information from the 
presentation of the steps in the procedure (e.g., separated by white space from the list of steps, or 
in a separate column). 
 
3. Follow the rules of grammar. Ungrammatical sentences are difficult to read and often 
misunderstood. 
 
4. Use short sentences with simple sentence structure. Break long sentences into short sentences.  
 
5. Write steps as imperatives (commands). 
 
6. Write steps as positive commands. Avoid negatives when possible. Negative statements are 
difficult to read. If the negative is missed, the meaning of the sentence will be misunderstood. 
When negatives are required, clearly specify what is being negated. 
 
7. Use active verbs. Sentences with active verbs are easier to read and less likely to be 
misunderstood than sentences using passive verb forms (e.g., “Do X” rather than “X should be 
done”). 
 
8. Use standard punctuation correctly. Use colons to indicate that a list will follow. Separate items 
in lists with commas when necessary. Semicolons conjoin what would be separate sentences. 
Because sentences in procedures should be as short as possible, semicolons are rarely required. 
 
2.5.2  Organization 
1. General organization. Organize procedures as simply as possible by the task to be performed. 
Normal procedures are typically organized in sequence by phase of flight. When applicable, non-
normal procedures should be organized by the triggering condition (e.g., “Smoke in the cockpit” 
rather than the potentially related system). 
 
2. Hierarchies. Use a simple numbering system for steps within a procedure to assist pilots in 
maintaining their place in the procedure. Excessively detailed hierarchies should be avoided. Use 
headers when necessary to distinguish major sections of multifaceted procedures. Headers should 
provide useful cues to the purpose of the section of the procedure they distinguish. 
 
3. Lists. Steps may require that the pilots perform several actions or check several different 
indications. Present these components on separate lines in an indented numbered or bulleted list 
rather than in the body of the text. 
 
4. References. Avoid references to other procedures or appendices whenever possible. 
 
5. Memory items. Avoid memory items whenever possible. If the procedure must include memory 
items, they should be clearly identified. 
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6. Indices. Provide an index for every procedure manual. In designing the index, keep in mind that 
pilots may adopt different index search strategies depending on their background and the 
situation. If a procedure is likely to be identified in more than one way (e.g., if there are multiple 
indications), include all likely referents in the index. 
 
2.5.3  Vocabulary 
1. Use words consistently. Word use should be simple and consistent throughout the SOPs. If 
possible, avoid creating new terms. Use words in their common English sense unless they have a 
widely accepted aviation specific meaning. Match flightdeck nomenclature. 
  
2. Avoid using words with multiple common meanings whenever possible (e.g., use “correct” rather 
than “right”). Avoid using the same words as both nouns and verbs (e.g., display, position); if a 
word is to be used that could be a noun or a verb, choose one usage and apply it consistently (e.g., 
move the switch into the ON position vs. position the switch to ON). 
 
3. Use short simple words. Avoid long words whenever a shorter word will do. 
 
4. Use abbreviations carefully. Only use abbreviations that are defined and commonly used in the 
industry (e.g., VNAV, Vref, MCP/FCU/FCP), and avoid creating new abbreviations whenever 
possible. 
 
5. Avoid using words that could be easily confused. In context, words that are similar in physical 
form or sound can be confused easily. For example, “descend, two four zero zero” (meaning 
2,400 feet) was fatally confused with “descend to four zero zero” (meaning 400 feet).  
 
2.5.4  Numbers 
1. Use Arabic numbers. Arabic numbers (e.g., 0, 1, 2) are easier to read than numbers that are 
spelled-out (e.g., one, two). However, use spelled-out numbers for references to the number of 
items or when two or more different values must be presented in close proximity to other numbers 
(e.g., use “one 10 kg weight,” rather than “1 10 kg weight”). 
 
2. Include units of measurement (e.g., feet, pounds, miles). 
 
3. Do not specify numbers in greater precision than is necessary, or than can be read from 
instruments. 
 
4. Avoid requiring pilots to perform mental calculations whenever possible. For example, use ranges 
(e.g., 10-20 KIAS) rather than error bands (e.g., 15 ± 5 KIAS). 
 
2.5.5  Format 
In determining how to format procedures, the purpose, mode, and conditions under which the 
displayed procedures will be used must be considered. Presentations of procedures that are meant to 
be used on the ground at leisure in printed form may use a different format from procedures that will 
be read from a tablet computer in a vibrating cockpit at night under time pressure. The 
recommendations presented here should not be taken as a substitute for evaluating the presentation 
under conditions approximating those under which the procedure display might be needed. 
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1. Type size. Use a type size that is large enough to be easily read under all conditions likely to be 
encountered. In general, a 14–20 point laser printed font6 is adequate for cockpit conditions. 
However, this should be tested under all potential operational conditions. 
 
2. Line spacing. Place sufficient space between lines of text. Using 25% to 33% of the font size 
between lines (e.g., 3–5 points space between lines using 14 point font) will make the text easier 
to read than if there was less space between the lines. 
 
3. Font. Avoid unusual or ornate fonts. The readability of specific fonts depends on many 
characteristics (e.g., openness of letters, inter-character spacing, etc.). Evidence for the greater 
readability of serif fonts (e.g., Times) or sans serif fonts (e.g., Helvetica) over the other is 
inconclusive.  
 
4. Case. Use standard capitalization rules. Text in all capital letters is harder to read than text in 
lower case. Use all capitals very sparingly and only for meaningful emphasis (e.g., WARNING) 
or to represent labels that are commonly encountered in capitals (e.g., FLCH). 
 
5. Grouping. Use visual techniques (e.g., white space created by extra lines, indentation) to delineate 
grouping of steps, lists, and the components of logic statements. 
 
6. Justification. Use left aligned text. Paragraphs of text should not be right and left justified so as to 
produce aligned right and left edges. Justification introduces spaces between letters and/or words 
that make the text harder to read.  
 
7. Line length. Traditionally, checklists have been formatted to resemble an index or table of 
contents with corresponding components (e.g., Challenge…Response) left and right justified and 
joined with dots or lines. Avoid excessively large gaps between the components. The wider the 
gap, the greater the chance that the pilot will make a mistake due to perceptual misalignment—
inadvertently skipping to the next line. 
 
2.5.6  Place-keeping 
1. Title. Clearly identify the procedure by title (e.g., “Before Start”) and the objective of the 
procedure when it is not obvious from the title. 
 
2. New lines. Begin each step in a procedure, each element in a logic statement, and each item in a 
multiple item list on a separate line. 
 
3. Bullets and numbering. Use numbers, bullets, and/or lines to indicate the beginning of each step. 
Using numbered lines can reduce navigation and place-keeping errors. If the procedure is 
interrupted, the pilot may be able to recall the last numbered step completed. Numbered steps also 
                                                
6 Point size is a convenient but inaccurate measure of letter size. Letters with the same point size can be 
substantially different sizes depending on the font. More accurate measures of letter size such as “x-height,” 
the distance between the baseline of a line of type and tops of the main body of lower case letters (e.g., “x”) 
exist but are not in common use. Furthermore, readability depends on more than just letter size (see other 
topics in this list). 
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facilitate navigation between procedures when it is necessary to “GO TO” a step within a 
procedure. 
 
4. Continuation. Clearly specify if a procedure continues onto another page (e.g., “Continues on 
Next Page”).  
 
5. End. Clearly mark the end of a procedure with a standard symbol and/or wording (e.g., “Checklist 
Complete”).  
 
2.5.7  Emphasis 
Emphasize: cautions and warnings (e.g., CAUTION, WARNING), negations (e.g., NOT), logic 
expressions (e.g., IF, THEN), and important notes (e.g., NOTE). Techniques for calling attention to 
certain words or phrases should be used sparingly and consistently. Overuse of emphasis reduces its 
effectiveness and makes the procedure hard to read.  
 
1. Typographical. Typographical emphasis techniques include bolding, italicizing, underlining, and 
using words in all capital letters. 
 
2. Graphical. Graphical emphasis techniques include framing, shading, coloring, and the use of 
standard symbols. 
 
3. Spatial. Spatial techniques for conveying emphasis include using white space to group text and 
reserving places on the page or screen for selected types of messages. 
 
4. Verbal. Verbal emphasis may be conveyed by using reserved words; e.g., Important, Note, 
Caution, and Warning. 
 
2.5.8  Conditional Steps 
In many procedures, some steps should be executed only when specified conditions occur. These 
conditional statements are a frequent source of confusion, particularly for novices and with rarely 
used procedures. However, this problem can be alleviated by keeping the statements well structured, 
clearly phrased, and as short as possible. 
 
1. Conditional statements should present all of the conditions clearly so that the correct choice is 
easy to identify. 
 
2. The steps that are associated with each condition should be grouped clearly. The end of a block of 
steps should be clearly identified and the action or procedure to be performed after completion of 
the block should be clearly specified. If there are embedded choices, then these subsidiary 
conditions also should be clearly delineated and the associated steps grouped clearly.  
 
3. Conditions should always precede actions. Actions that are irreversible should be identified in the 
condition preceding the action. 
 
4. Conditional words should be emphasized. 
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5. Conditional statements may begin with one of the following words: 
• IF – use to indicate a condition that may or may not happen.  
• WHEN – use to indicate a condition that must be met before an action is taken and that 
condition is very likely to occur (e.g., “WHEN pressure reaches 120 psi THEN put gear 
down.”) 
• THEN – use to identify actions that should be taken when the specified condition occurs 
• AND – use to combine two conditions that must be met before the action is taken 
• OR – use to indicate that one or more of several conditions must be met before the action is 
taken 
 
However, alternative formats may be used as long as they are used consistently and the intention 
is clear. For example: 
IF light x is lit 
THEN open valve y 
IF light x is NOT lit 
THEN open valve z 
 
may be expressed as: 
 
CHOOSE one: 
Light x is illuminated 
• Open valve y 
Light x is extinguished 
• Open valve z 
 
6. Complex conditional statements. Avoid using combinations of AND and OR whenever possible. 
In general, use separate steps instead. In particularly complex cases, a flow chart or logic table 
may be preferable.  
 
7. Waiting, continuous actions, repeated actions. In some cases, an action must be continued or 
repeated until some condition occurs. In these cases, specify: what actions are to be repeated, the 
conditions under which those actions should be stopped, and whether the remaining steps in the 
procedure can be continued in the meantime. For example: “Hold button depressed UNTIL 
pressure reaches 120 psi, THEN GOTO step 5 in this procedure.”  
 
2.5.9  Cross-references 
1. Avoid cross-references to other procedures whenever possible. In most cases, a “Go-in, Stay-in” 
strategy should be used whereby all necessary steps for completing a procedure are included in 
that procedure. However, in some cases this may prove impractical. 
 
2. Explicit reference. When used, cross-references should be explicit and use consistent wording. For 
example: 
GO TO [referred procedure name] Step [step #] on Page [page #] 
 
3. Returning. As noted above, in general a “Go-in, Stay-in” strategy should be used whereby all 
necessary steps for completing a procedure are included in that procedure. If a cross-reference 
must be used, then the steps in the referring procedure that must still be performed should be 
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included in the cross-referenced procedure. However, in some cases this may be impractical and 
once selected steps within the referred procedure are completed, the pilot should return to the 
original procedure. In these cases, a step should be included in the referred procedure that 
explicitly instructs the pilot to return to the previous procedure: (e.g., RETURN TO [step #] IN 
[original procedure]). When the previous procedure should not be continued, this should be stated 
explicitly in both the referring and referred procedures. 
 
4. Version control. Version control is always important. When references to other procedures are 
required, version control becomes more difficult. Changes made to either the referring or referred 
procedures could affect the execution of the included steps. 
 
2.5.10  Flow Charts and Logic Tables 
When a procedure contains multiple decision points (e.g., diagnostic procedures), it may be 
preferable to use a flow chart or logic table instead of a complex set of conditional statements. 
However, the branches in complex flow charts with multiple lines can be confused. Flow charts 
should not be used when only a simple sequence of actions is required. To decrease the likelihood of 
reading errors, the amount of text included in flow charts should be minimized. Limit the text to 
actions, decision points, and diagnostic criteria. 
 
1. Symbols. Use flow chart symbols consistently. 
 
2. Layout. Using white space, arrange flow charts into apparent rows and columns with a clear 
consistent direction. 
 
3. Combining branches. When multiple branches lead to the same point in the flow chart, they 
should be combined as soon as possible. 
 
4. Crossing branches. Avoid crossing flow lines whenever possible. To avoid crossings, repeat steps 
in separate branches. If a crossing cannot be avoided, use a bridge in the flow line (see Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5. A bridge over crossing lines in a flow chart. 
 
 
2.5.11  Warnings and Cautions 
Warnings and cautions alert procedure users to hazards that could do serious harm to people or 
equipment. They should be used in addition to (not instead of) steps describing the actions that 
should be taken and they should be used sparingly. Overuse of warnings will decrease their 
effectiveness. Often “warning” and “caution” are used as synonyms. However, warnings are 
sometimes used to refer to hazards to people whereas cautions are used for hazards to equipment. 
  
47 
 
Sometimes “warning” is used to convey a more urgent or critical matter than “caution.” The 
meaning of these words should be defined and used consistently. 
 
1. Use negative imperative active voice. For example, “CAUTION: Do not attempt manual restart if 
automatic start fails. Starter may be damaged.” 
 
2. Components of warnings and cautions. Each warning or caution should identify: a single hazard, 
the consequences of the hazard, and any critical time constraints. Actions should not appear in 
warnings or cautions.  
 
3. Placement. Warnings and cautions should be placed on the same page and before the steps to 
which they apply. Keep procedural steps separated from warnings and cautions graphically. 
 
2.6  Step 6: Implementing New Procedures 
Implementation is an important part of the procedure development process. For a procedure 
development process to be successful, the new or modified procedures must be effectively 
disseminated, properly trained, and appropriately promoted. In this section, the issues that arise in 
implementing procedures are considered and a framework for the implementation process is 
briefly described. 
 
2.6.1  Implementation Issues 
2.6.1.1  Resistance to Change 
Many good ideas don’t get implemented, or if implemented—fail, because the people who bring the 
new ideas assume that everybody will immediately see their value and recognize their merit and be 
happy to adopt them. This is rarely the case. In fact, change by its very nature creates conflict. For 
many reasons, people often resist change. Resistance that is not addressed could lead to selective 
non-compliance. To preempt this resistance, the reasons for resisting change must be carefully 
considered well in advance of proposing the change, and an implementation plan needs to be 
designed that includes steps aimed at overcoming such resistance.  
 
Common reasons for resisting change include: 
Habits. Pilot training invests much time and effort in developing strong habit patterns, and 
pilots invest much time and effort in acquiring these habit patterns and turning them into 
skills. So, pilots are reluctant to change these habit patterns unless they can be convinced that 
the change is of sufficient value to justify the effort involved in unlearning old habits and 
acquiring new ones. 
Perceived risk. Any change involves some risk. Pilots might misunderstand the new 
procedures and make mistakes. Under stress, pilots might occasionally fall back onto their 
old habit patterns, mix the actions required by the old and new procedures, and create 
confusion. A change that is not carefully thought out may create conflicts among new 
procedures, between new and old procedures, or between the new procedural demands and 
company policy or philosophy. If the potential risks are not properly assessed, managed, and 
communicated, pilots may fail to follow new procedures because they believe them to be 
riskier than the procedures that they replaced. 
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Superfluous change. In a successful airline, the vast majority of pilots will likely feel that 
they are doing a good job and that things are working out well. The pilots may feel that 
whatever “problem” the change is claiming to address is not a problem they are experiencing. 
Sometimes the problem or the circumstances that triggered the procedure design project are 
not easily perceived by line pilots. In other cases, pilots might actually see the problem, but 
fail to appreciate its significance. Thus, the change might be seen as superfluous. 
Better alternatives. Pilots may believe that they have better solutions than the proposed 
change. They may feel that the proposed change is imposed from above by people who don’t 
really understand the reality of the operation and therefore should not be trusted. 
For example, in many mergers a company flying one type of aircraft buys a company that has 
been flying another type of aircraft. If the purchasing company imposes its procedures on all 
pilots, the pilots from the acquired company may feel that the new management does not 
know how to operate their aircraft and does not understand the nature of their operation. 
Hence, these pilots may believe that their old procedures are superior to the new procedures 
that they are required to follow. This belief can breed intentional non-compliance. 
 
2.6.2  Training 
Training is an important part of the procedure implementation process. The better the training, the 
smoother the transition, and the easier the acceptance of the change.  
 
2.6.2.1  Content 
Training for a new procedure should include: 
1. A detailed description of the new procedure. 
2. When the new procedure should be performed. 
3. How to perform the new procedure. 
4. Why the new procedure was adopted. 
5. Who to contact for more information. 
 
2.6.2.2  Scope 
The scope of the training for the new procedures depends on the scope of the change. A small simple 
change may only require minimal training, whereas a large scale change may require extensive 
training.  
 
At many airlines, pilots complain about “training by bulletin.” That is, all too often a change to 
procedures is made and announced to the pilots via a bulletin, which usually says something to the 
effect of “from now on do X.” There is very little, if any, explanation about the background for the 
change, why it was needed, or what problem it is trying to solve. Worse yet, there is no rationale to 
explain the particular choices made and no evidence that the change has been carefully and 
thoroughly thought out. These kinds of bulletins breed apathy and resentment. Pilots resign 
themselves to the seeming arbitrariness of management, and surrender their intellect and judgment. 
 
Although a simple minor change can be “trained by bulletin,” this bulletin must be carefully 
composed. It must demonstrate that even though the change is minor, the company has taken the 
time and effort required to think it through carefully and comprehensively. The bulletin is an 
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opportunity for the company to transmit the message that it appreciates its pilots, and respects their 
intellectual ability. 
 
Larger scale changes to procedures require extensive training. In many cases, this training can be 
accomplished using computer based/distance training products. If the changes are substantial, either 
because of their scope or their difference from the previous procedures, it would be very useful to 
include video clips showing how the new procedures should be performed.  
 
In some cases, it may be necessary to provide demonstrations and practice in procedure trainers or 
flight simulators. This may be the case when crew certification is required for a new type of 
operation, or when new equipment is introduced that substantially changes the pilot’s role or actions. 
 
2.6.2.3  Layered Training 
Training can be presented in layers. The top layer is mandatory for all pilots, whereas only those 
who want to know more need access the deeper layers. The top layer should present the basic 
information about what needs to be done and how to do it. A second layer could provide basic 
background about the need for the change and the way the particular change addresses that need. A 
third layer could provide a description of the process through which the change was designed, 
including examples of data collected in the analysis of the problem and in crafting the solution, and 
an outline of the testing the change has undergone. These descriptions can include pictures and video 
clips taken during team meetings and in the simulator during testing. A fourth layer could then 
provide detailed rationale for the choices made, including a discussion of the possible solutions 
considered and rejected with the rationale for the rejections.  
 
2.6.2.4  Evaluation 
The effectiveness of the training should be evaluated before it is used broadly throughout the airline. 
 
2.6.3  Dissemination 
Relevant company manuals and publications must reflect the changes to the procedures. To be 
consistent, the new procedures should be written in the same style and format as existing procedures, 
in accordance with company policies and philosophy, and compliant with regulatory requirements. 
Care should be taken to provide the appropriate level of information in the relevant publications. For 
instance, detailed explanations of background and rationale may be best published in a training 
manual rather than in the operations manual. 
 
2.6.4 Procedure Implementation Process 
To increase the likelihood of a successful implementation, the procedure implementation process 
should begin when the procedure development process begins. The choices made by the procedure 
developers early in the process can affect the ease with which the procedures are implemented.  
 
Changes are likely to encounter resistance and even apprehension. To facilitate the implementation 
of new procedures, an educational campaign might be needed to address such resistance and to 
alleviate any apprehension. Such a campaign must be carefully planned. To be successful, it has to 
engage many tools to reach the line pilots from as many directions and in as many ways as possible. 
Large changes such as in the case of a merger must be promoted throughout all levels of 
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management and the pilots’ unions to show the complete commitment of the company to the success 
of the change. 
 
2.6.4.1  Personnel 
To facilitate the implementation of large scale procedural changes, a broad representation of the pilot 
group including Captains, First Officers, instructors, check airmen, management, and union should 
be included in the development process.  
 
By the inclusion of line pilots, the argument that the new procedures were designed by people who 
don’t understand the reality of line operations can be countered. Including both FOs and Captains 
from a broad geographical representation of the pilot group counters the “not invented here” 
argument. When both management and union representatives participate in the effort, they can serve 
as ambassadors to their respective constituents and facilitate buy-in by all. When instructors are 
included, they can provide insight into training considerations throughout the process. Then, they 
can help build appropriate training. Check Airmen can provide insights into standardization and 
evaluation considerations.  
 
2.6.4.2  Data 
The suggested processes of data collection in the effort to understand the problem (Step 3 above) 
and in the effort to craft a solution (Step 4 above) can also support successful implementation.  
 
The argument that there was no problem that needed to be fixed can be countered by presenting (in 
summary form) the careful analysis of the issues triggering the whole procedure development effort. 
The extent of the data collection effort, such as the different databases searched and the combination 
of aircraft (FOQA/FDAP/FDM), pilot reports (ASAP/ASRS), and observational (LOSA, Line 
Checks, training) data used can further demonstrate the extent of the issues, as well as the 
thoroughness of the development effort. Both can provide important arguments in favor of the 
proposed change.  
 
2.6.4.3  Documentation 
Careful documentation of the whole review and development process, and in particular—the 
documentation of the rationale for the various decisions made—also serves the implementation 
process. 
 
Particular emphasis should be placed on documenting the rationale for rejecting possible solutions. 
Some such possible solutions are likely to have come from line pilots’ techniques and workarounds, 
and many of them are likely to be brought up by pilots once the new procedures are implemented. 
By disseminating the rationale for the new procedures and for rejecting alternatives, many potential 
critics may be satisfied and the likelihood of resistance to the changes greatly diminished. 
 
Parts of the procedure development process itself can become parts of the training. For instance, at 
various points during the testing of the proposed procedures, procedure developers can document 
their own learning. This information can be used in developing the training materials. Video 
recordings of the testing and validation of the procedures can be embedded in the training. These 
video clips can be used to demonstrate the thoroughness of the process. If the procedure performed 
is the final product, the video becomes a demonstration of how the procedure should be executed.  
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Also, careful documentation of the development process serves as the basis for the application to the 
FAA for approval of the new procedures. New cockpit procedures must be approved by the 
operator’s designated POI prior to implementation. To be able to implement the proposed procedure 
smoothly, it’s best to engage the POI early in the process, provide the POI with regular updates, and 
include in the final application the complete documentation of the whole development process. Such 
involvement allows the POI to ascertain the thoroughness of the process and the quality of the 
proposed changes.  
 
2.7  Step 7: Evaluating and Monitoring the Conduct of Procedures in Practice 
New procedures need to be evaluated prior to their release, and also following their implementation. 
Evaluation should not be regarded as an unnecessary task that can be performed if there is time and 
extra resources. Evaluation is a critical part of the process and an important guard against the 
potential failure of the whole endeavor. 
 
No matter how many smart people are working on the procedure design and development project, 
errors will occur. The only way to catch mistakes and avoid costly new problems is to perform a 
careful evaluation. The procedure developers might all agree that the new procedures are reasonable, 
but the procedures must be tested in a simulator, tried by other pilots, and tested on the line, where 
the world is much more complex than in the simulator. The new procedures must be given a chance 
to fail. 
 
A well-designed outcome evaluation is a systematic way to find problems in proposed procedures 
before they are implemented. The evaluation allows for testing whether the new procedures work in 
the environment for which they were designed and with the people who will be using them. A 
thorough evaluation can discover problems that were not anticipated and generate solutions before 
the problems produce serious consequences.  
 
Evaluations are conducted to provide accurate assessments of the expected effects of an intervention. 
In general, the best evaluations are conducted using multiple methods. To perform them, one can use 
simulations, questionnaires, archival data, and line observations. Evaluations are conducted late in 
the development process, once the procedure developers have settled on a set of procedures that they 
believe will work. Procedure evaluations occur both before and after the new procedures are 
implemented on the line. 
 
2.7.1  Evaluation Process 
The evaluation process can be divided into 6 steps: 
1. Determine what to measure. 
2. Create a research design. 
3. Develop measures. 
4. Collect data. 
5. Analyze data. 
6. Report the results. 
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2.7.1.1  What to Measure 
In general evaluations are designed to obtain measures of procedural compliance and errors in the 
execution of procedures, as well as measures related to the other goals of the procedure design or 
redesign effort—i.e., meeting the requirements of correctness, reliability, robustness, resilience, 
effectiveness, efficiency, etc. 
 
The evaluation cannot rely solely on measures of ultimate consequence such as accidents or 
incidents. Commercial aviation in the United States is an extremely safe enterprise. Hence, the 
likelihood of encountering any serious consequence during an evaluation is extremely low. Rather 
than rely on measures of ultimate consequence, the evaluation must rely on measures of factors that 
increase the risk of a serious consequence. Risk is a function of the probability and consequence of 
an adverse event. Thus, the risk of an accident is increased whenever the likelihood of having an 
accident or the seriousness of the consequences of the event is increased. Procedural errors may 
increase the likelihood of an accident.  
 
For example, a procedure may call for the flaps to be set for takeoff prior to leaving the departure 
gate area. Failing to do so increases the risk of an accident because the pilot must now remember to 
configure the aircraft for takeoff without procedural support. Of course, it is still unlikely that this 
procedural error will produce an accident. The pilot might remember, the crew might notice the error 
while performing a pre-takeoff checklist, or the Take Off Warning System may alert the crew to the 
problem when the throttles are advanced. However, the failure to properly execute this procedure 
increases the risk of an accident. Thus, one could use a count of the number of errors made on 
critical procedures as an indirect measure of safety. If a change in the procedures increases the 
likelihood of an error occurring or the number of observed errors, the risk has increased. 
 
2.7.1.2  Research Design 
To evaluate procedures, we are generally interested in comparing operations using one set of 
procedures, to operations using a different set of procedures. This typically involves comparing 
operations conducted at one airline under new procedures to operations conducted at the same airline 
under a previous set of procedures. To do that, an initial set of data reflecting operations under the 
existing procedures must be collected early in the procedure development process, once it is clear 
what aspects of the operation are likely to be affected by the anticipated change. That way the data 
collection could target these specific aspects of the operation and establish a benchmark, or a 
baseline, against which later data could be compared.  
 
Once the new procedures have been implemented, data collection for the evaluation may have to be 
done in stages or in cycles. For example, it may be prudent to introduce the changes in the spring 
when weather is mild and there is no holiday travel pressure. Once introduced, the procedures should 
be evaluated. Such an evaluation also provides important feedback concerning the effectiveness of 
the training and of the whole implementation effort. The procedures should be evaluated again later, 
when winter operations are in effect, to test the reliability and robustness of the new procedures 
under these different operating conditions. 
 
2.7.1.3  Measures 
Good measures should be: (1) valid—measuring what they purport to measure; (2) reliable—
producing the same result when nothing has changed; (3) sensitive—demonstrating changes when 
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the thing being measured changes; (4) accurate—not showing systematic biases; and (5) precise—
demonstrating little error. These characteristics serve as the criteria for evaluating the measures to be 
used in the evaluation and provide the basis for choosing one measure over another. 
 
Valid. The measure measures what it claims to measure. For example, in evaluating procedures, one 
should be concerned that pilot workload at any given time not be excessive. The term “workload” is 
generally used to refer to the perceptual, cognitive, and physical demands placed on an individual. A 
measure of workload that examined only one of these aspects would not be a valid measure of 
“workload” because a task could place demands on the individual in ways other than those 
measured. If the invalid measure were used, these workload demands could affect performance 
while escaping notice. 
 
Reliable. The measure consistently produces the same results when the thing being measured has 
not changed. 
 
Sensitive. The measure is able to detect small changes. The more sensitive the measure, the better it 
is in detecting changes. For example, one could use falling asleep on the job as a measure of fatigue. 
There is little dispute that falling asleep at the controls is often a result of fatigue. However, pilots 
can be quite fatigued and display impaired cognitive and motor performance long before they fall 
asleep. Counting the number of incidents of pilots sleeping at the controls is a relatively insensitive 
measure of pilot fatigue. There are many measures of fatigue (e.g., self report, eye-lid droop, 
reaction time, electroencephalography) that are much more sensitive measures of fatigue than are 
episodes of unplanned sleep. Sensitive measures allow measuring the effects of procedural changes 
with fewer observations over shorter time periods than would be required if only less sensitive 
measures were used. 
 
Accuracy and precision. There is error in every measurement. This error can be random, i.e., as 
likely to produce an underestimate as an overestimate, or biased, systematically over or 
underestimating the true value. Accuracy measures the degree of systematic error. Precision 
measures the degree of random error. For example, some observers sitting on the jumpseat may have 
difficulty judging the aircraft’s speed during taxi. Sometimes they underestimate the aircraft’s speed 
and sometimes they overestimate the aircraft’s speed. Hence, sometimes aircraft that are taxiing too 
fast are judged to be taxiing safely and sometimes aircraft that are taxiing at safe speeds are judged 
to be taxiing too fast. These observers are accurate (as likely to make errors in one direction as the 
other) but imprecise (making large errors). Other observers may consistently underestimate the 
speed of the taxi, judging aircraft that are taxiing too fast as taxiing at safe speeds, and judging 
aircraft that are taxiing at safe speeds as taxiing too slowly. These observers are inaccurate 
(systematically biased) but may be quite precise (making small errors). Any combination of 
accuracy and precision is possible. Ideally, measures would be accurate and precise. 
 
2.7.1.4  Data Collection 
As noted previously (see Step 3 above), there are several different sources of data that are generally 
available for use in evaluating procedures. These include flight data recorded from aircraft systems 
and instruments (e.g., FOQA/FDAP/FDM data), cockpit observations (e.g., LOSA; line checks), and 
self-reports (e.g., ASAP reports, responses to questionnaires).  
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The logistics involved in collecting data should not be underestimated. If substantial changes are 
made to procedures used throughout the company, data will need to be gathered from all parts of all 
of the fleets. Of course, if changes are made only to a particular procedure used by only one type of 
aircraft, then data may be obtained from only the affected fleet and the affected operation.  
 
The data collection process may require the cooperation of information technology, safety, 
scheduling, flight operations, and other units. For example, if experienced pilots are to be used as 
observers, they will need to be freed from their normal duties long enough to be trained and to 
conduct the observations. To efficiently capture all of the different facets of the operation of a large 
airline, scheduling will need to work to devise sequences of flights so that observers can move from 
one flight to another with minimal downtime and not too many nights away from base while 
sampling from all of the types of operations that the airline conducts (e.g., time of day, type of 
airport, geographic location, etc.). Commercial questionnaire software can be used to produce 
electronic questionnaires, but information technology will need to be involved if the questionnaire is 
to be hosted on the company servers and the data properly saved and confidentially downloaded for 
analysis. If flight data records are used, the data will need to be summarized and de-identified to 
protect pilots’ confidentiality. This will probably require the cooperation of the safety department (or 
a flight data management department) and possibly the pilots’ union.  
 
2.7.1.5  Data Analysis 
The job of the data analyst is to accurately summarize and present the data. In general, this will 
involve calculating descriptive statistics; e.g., counts of events, measures of central tendency (e.g., 
means, medians, modes), and measures of dispersion (e.g., standard deviation, ranges).  
 
Most of the questions that are needed in an evaluation, such as “is the number of errors made greater 
under the old procedures or the new procedures” can be answered simply by inspection of the 
relevant descriptive statistics. Inferential statistics are used to determine whether the observed 
differences are so large relative to the variation within the groups so that it is unlikely that the 
difference is just a product of random variation across the observations. For example, the average 
number of procedural errors made by crews using new procedures may be lower than the average 
number of errors made by crews flying with the old procedures. However, some crews may have 
made substantially more errors than others. In fact, some of the crews flying with the new 
procedures may have made more errors than some of the crews flying with the old procedures. An 
inferential statistic can be used to determine, at a specified probability level, whether the observed 
difference between the old and the new procedures is such that it is unlikely to have happened by 
chance. However, it must be remembered that a difference can be “statistically significant,” meaning 
that it is unlikely to be due to random fluctuations, and very small, thus not operationally 
meaningful. 
 
2.7.1.6  Reporting Results 
The results of any evaluation will need to be communicated. Possible audiences include procedure 
designers, management, regulators, training, and the pilots themselves. Good communication begins 
with understanding the needs and capabilities of the audience. It should answer the questions that the 
audience is asking, and provide the information in a manner that the audience can easily understand. 
In every case, the presentation of the evaluation should be focused on the important questions and be 
as simple as possible without sacrificing accuracy. Descriptions of the sources of data and the 
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methods used should accompany the results. Results should be organized to allow easy recognition 
of the important comparisons. 
 
2.7.1.7  Cycles of Evaluation 
Evaluating the effectiveness of interventions is an iterative process. Operators can incorporate such 
evaluations into regular cycles of LOSA, collect data from line checks and training events, and 
continuously monitor FOQA and ASAP data for relevant indicators. Operators should also consider 
periodic surveys of the pilots to elicit information about practices on the line and to monitor for any 
changes that would merit the review and redesign of operating procedures. The aviation industry and 
the operational environment are dynamic. Technology changes at an ever-accelerating pace, and the 
pilot group is constantly changing as well. Policies and procedures must be continuously updated to 
keep up and to stay ahead of all these changes. 
 
 
3.0  Conclusion 
This report has sought to summarize a long and complex project. Like any summary, it cannot cover 
all of the nuances in detail. However, we trust that it has delineated the main points in sufficient 
detail to allow readers to understand the essence of the topic. It is our intention to continue this work 
and to produce fuller treatments of all of the topics described here. 
 
At the birth of aviation, pilots did not follow systematic procedures. However, they learned quickly 
that some ways of doing things were substantially better than others. These “ways of doing things” 
were communicated to the next generation of aviators and eventually written down. As aviation 
grew and became organized by the military, the mail services, and eventually airlines, these written 
procedures became prescriptions. At this point in time, no one in aviation questions the importance 
of having good procedures. But procedure development remains more of an art than a science and 
even the definition of what makes a good procedure remains unclear. This is the current challenge 
for procedure development in aviation and it is the challenge that we have sought to address in the 
work described here. Although it may never be possible to produce a formula for creating good 
procedures, the work reported here indicates that “procedures for procedure development” can be 
developed which can systematically improve operational procedures and thereby improve 
operational safety and efficiency. 
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Appendix 
Procedure Design Process Summaries 
 
 
 
I. Requirements for Procedures 
 
Procedures are developed to accomplish specific tasks. Every procedure has a primary requirement:  
Correct. The specified actions will yield the desired outcome. 
 
Furthermore, every procedure has three basic requirements. Good procedures should be: 
Reliable. Under normal conditions, whenever the specified actions are accomplished, the desired 
outcome will obtain.  
Robust. The procedure will succeed in achieving the desired outcome despite minor variations in 
the performance of the equipment, the actions of the human operators, or in the operational 
environment.  
Resilient. The procedure will succeed in achieving the desired outcome despite errors or 
unexpected variations. 
 
A procedure is either correct or not. However, reliability, robustness, and resilience are matters of 
degree. The more reliable, robust, and resilient the procedure, the better the procedure. In addition to 
these three basic requirements, there are a number of subsidiary criteria that support these 
requirements. These subsidiary criteria are not independent of each other and one criterion may need 
to be traded off against another. In general, procedures should be: 
Efficient. The procedure should require the least amount of time and effort possible. 
Useable. The procedure should be “easy” to use.  
Coordinated. Procedures should incorporate steps that ensure adequate coordination between 
participating individuals. 
Integrated. Procedures should be well integrated into the workflow.  
Consistent. Individual procedures should be consistent with other procedures, as well as with 
relevant policies and the overall operational philosophy.  
Trainable. Procedures should be easy to train. 
Adaptable. Procedures should be able to be adapted to foreseeable changes in technology, 
people, and the operational environment. 
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II. Design of Procedures 
 
A well-designed procedure aids flight crews by specifying a sequence of actions that if followed 
ensures that the primary task at hand will be carried out in a manner that meets the above basic 
requirements and, to the extent possible, meets all of the subsidiary criteria.  
 
In general, good procedures specify 5 things: 
1. What the procedure is designed to accomplish. 
2. When and/or under what conditions the procedure should be executed. 
3. Who is responsible for executing each step in the procedure. 
4. How, in detail, the procedure is to be performed.  
5. How to confirm that the procedure has been accomplished properly. 
 
In addition, the procedure designer must consider what type of safety margins, barriers, and buffers 
should be built into the procedure, as well as what types of steps are required. Steps can be of the 
following types but not all types of steps must be present in any given procedure: 
1. Information gathering. 
2. Information processing. 
3. Conditional branching. 
4. Decision making. 
5. Waiting. 
6. Action. 
7. Verification. 
8. Validation. 
 
A general approach to the process of developing procedures follows the 5 steps below. These steps 
are iterated when necessary: 
1. Develop a prototype task procedure. 
2. Analyze prototype procedure. 
3. Eliminate conflicts. 
4. Develop phase procedure. 
5. Test procedure. 
 
  
  
58 
 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
Aarons, R. N. (2001, March). Customizing your aircraft’s checklist. Business & Commercial 
Aviation. Retrieved from: http://aviationweek.com/awin/customizing-your-aircrafts-checklist 
Airbus. (2002). Operational philosophy: Introduction (01.010, July 28/05). A318/A319/A320/A321: 
Flight Crew Training Manual. France. Author. 
Airbus. (2013a). Flight operations briefing notes: Standard operating procedures - Normal 
checklists. Retrieved from http://www.airbus.com/company/aircraft-manufacture/quality-and-
safety-first/safety-library/?contentId=[_TABLE%3Att_content%3B_FIELD%3Auid]% 
2C&cHash=22935adfac92fcbbd4ba4e1441d13383 
Airbus. (2013b). Flight operations briefing notes: Standard operating procedures - Operating 
philosophy. Retrieved from http://www.airbus.com/company/aircraft-manufacture/quality-and-
safety-first/safety-library/?contentId=[_TABLE%3Att_content%3B_FIELD%3Auid]%2C& 
cHash=22935adfac92fcbbd4ba4e1441d13383 
Airbus. (n.d.). Auto flight: General (1.22.10, Seq 100, Rev 32). Flight Crew Operating Manual A320 
- For Training Only (Volume 1, pp. 1-2). France: Author. 
http://www.airbus.com/company/aircraft-manufacture/quality-and-safety-first/safety-
library/?contentId=%5b_TABLE%3Att_content%3B_FIELD%3Auid%5d%2C&cHash=22935a
dfac92fcbbd4ba4e1441d13383 
Airbus. (n.d.). FMGS overview - General philosophy (4.01.10, Seq 001, Rev 06). Flight Crew 
Operations Manual A320 - For Training Only (Volume 4). France: Author. 
Airbus. (n.d.). Standard operating procedures - General information (3.03.01, Seq 001, Rev 35). 
Flight Crew Operating Manual A320 (Volume 3, p. 1). France: Author. 
Amalberti, R. (2001). The paradoxes of almost totally safe transportation systems.  Safety Science, 
37, 109-126. 
Antonsen, S., Almklov, P., & Fenstad, J. (2008). Reducing the gap between procedures and practice 
- Lessons from a successful safety intervention [Online forum]. Safety Science Monitor, 12(1), 1-
16. Retrieved from Safety Science Monitor website: 
http://ssmon.chb.kth.se/vol12/2Antonsen.pdf  
Antonsen, S., Skarholt, K., & Ringstad, A. J. (2012). The role of standardization in safety 
management - A case study of a major oil & gas company. Safety Science, 50, 2001-2009. 
Arriaga, A., Bader, A., Wong, J., Lipsitz, S., Berry, W., Ziewacz, J., Hepner, D., Boorman, D., 
Pozner, C., Smink, D., & Gawande, A. (2013). Simulation-based trial of surgical-crisis 
checklists. New England Journal of Medicine, 368(3), 246-253. Retrieved from The New 
England Journal of Medicine 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsa1204720#t=articleBackground  
  
59 
 
Au, H. (2005). Line pilot performance of memory items. Proceedings of the 13th International 
Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Oklahoma City, OK. Retrieved from 
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/maintenance_hf/library/documents/media/human_factors_m
aintenance/line_pilot_performance_of_memory_items.pdf 
Bainbridge, L. (1993). Planning the training of a complex skill. Le Travail Humain, 56(2/3), 211-
232. 
Bakdash, J. Z., & Drews, F. A. (2012). Using knowledge in the world to improve patient safety: 
Designing affordances in health care equipment to specify a sequential “checklist”. Human 
Factors and Ergonomics in Manufacturing & Service Industries 22 (1) 7–20. 
Baldwin, H. (2010, June). Rethinking the checklist. Overhaul & Maintenance. Retrieved from: 
http://aviationweek.com/awin/rethinking-checklist 
Barazandeh, A. F. (2012). Aviation checklists: Normal/abnormal & emergency for fixed-wing & 
helicopters (EASA Research Project EASA.2012/1 Principles and guidelines relative to the 
design of checklists and working methods in the cockpit). Retrieved from the EASA website: 
https://www.easa.europa.eu/safety-and-research/research-projects/docs/large-
aeroplanes/Final_Study_Report_1-2012.pdf 
Baron, R. (1997). The cockpit, the cabin, and social psychology [Online forum]. Retrieved from 
http://airlinesafety.com/editorials/CockpitCabinPsychology.htm  
Barshi, I. & Healy, A. (1993). Checklist procedures and the cost of automaticity. Memory & 
Cognition, 21(4), 496-505. 
Baum, M.S., Neal, D., Peri, R., Randomsky, M., Rhodes, B., Sachs, R., Smith, J., Steinman, D., & 
Turner, T. (Eds.). (n.d.). Helicopter pilots model code of conduct: Tools to advance helicopter 
flight safety and professionalism (Version 1.0). Retrieved from Aviators Model Code of Conduct 
website: http://www.secureav.com/HMCC-v1.0.pdf  
Baum, M.S., Peri, R., Randomsky, M., Rhodes, B., Sachs, R., Smith, J., Steinman, D., & Turner, T. 
(Eds.). (n.d.). Aviators model code of conduct: Tools to advance aviation safety and 
professionalism (Version 2.0). Retrieved from  
Aviators Model Code of Conduct website: http://www.secureav.com/AMCC-v2.pdf  
Berry, K. A., & Sawyer, M. W. (2013). Understanding the human component of area navigation 
procedures across the national airspace system. Proceedings of the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society 57th Annual Meeting, San Diego, CA, 76-80. doi: 
10.1177/1541931213571019. Retrieved from http://pro.sagepub.com/content/57/1/76 
Blomberg, R., Ramu J., Degani, A., Speyer, J., & Kanki, B. (1999). Evolving flight operations data 
standards: Is there a need for early identification of specifications? In R. Travers (Moderator), 
Proceedings of American Association for Artificial Intelligence (pp. 195-197). Retrieved from 
AAAI website: http://www.aaai.org/Papers/HCI/2002/HCI02-032.pdf 
Boeing. (1999, July 30). Checklist information - Normal checklists (Chapter 1, Section 1). 737 
Quick Reference Handbook. Washington: Author. 
Boeing. (2013a, October 21). Aviation safety: Working together to make sure flying as safe as 
possible. Retrieved from http://www.boeing.com/boeing/commercial/safety/industry.page 
  
60 
 
Boeing. (2013b, October 21). The Boeing edge: Electronic checklist. Retrieved from 
http://www.boeing.com/boeing/commercial/aviationservices/flight-services/flight-
operations/flight-documents/ecl.page 
Boeing. (2013c, October 21). The Boeing edge: Flight operations. Retrieved from 
http://www.boeing.com/boeing/commercial/aviationservices/flight-services/flight-
operations/index.page 
Boeing Flight Technical & Safety. (2011, May). The checklist builder (Rev 3). Washington: Author. 
http://www.aaai.org/Papers/HCI/2002/HCI02-032.pdf 
Bolton, M. L., & Bass, E. J. (2012). Using model checking to explore checklist-guided pilot 
behavior. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 22(4), 343-366. 
Boorman, D. (2000, September). Reducing flight crew errors and minimizing new error modes with 
electronic checklists. Proceedings of the International Conference on Human-Computer 
Interaction in Aeronautics, Toulouse, France. 
Boorman, D. (2001). Today’s electronic checklists reduce likelihood of crew errors and prevent 
mishaps. ICAO Journal, 1, 17-36. 
Bourrier, M., & Bieder, C. (2013). Trapping safety into rules: An introduction. In Trapping Safety 
Into Rules: How Desirable or Avoidable is Proceduralization? (pp. 1-8). Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate. 
Bureau Enquêtes-Accidentes. (1999). Airfrance boeing 747-428B. Tahiti faa’a international airport, 
French polynesia. December 13, 1993. (Aircraft accident report, F-TA930913). Le Bourget 
cedex, France. 
Callantine, T. J. (2001, October). The crew activity tracking system: Leveraging flight data for 
aiding, training and analysis. Paper presented at the 20th Digital Avionics Systems Conference, 
Dayton Beach, FL. doi 10.1109/DASC.2001.963408 
Chandra, D. C., & Grayhem, R. (2013). Evaluation of a technique to simplify depictions of visually 
complex aeronautical procedures for NextGen. Proceedings of the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society 57th Annual Meeting, San Diego, CA, 86-90. doi: 
10.1177/1541931213571021. Retrieved from http://pro.sagepub.com/content/57/1/86 
Choi, S.Y., & Park, J. (2012). Operator behaviors observed in following emergency operating 
procedures under a simulated emergency. Nuclear Engineering & Technology, 44(4), 379-386. 
Civil Aviation Authority. (2002). CAP 719: Fundamental human factors concepts. Retrieved from 
http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP719.PDF 
Civil Aviation Authority. (2005). CAP 708: Guidance on the design, presentation and use of 
electronic checklists. Retrieved from http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP708.PDF  
Civil Aviation Authority. (2006). CAP 676: Guidance on the design, presentation and use of 
emergency and abnormal checklists. Retrieved from http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP676.PDF  
Clay-Williams, R., & Colligan, L. (2015). Back to basics: Checklists in aviation and healthcare. BMJ 
Qual Saf, 24, 428-431.  
  
61 
 
Comisión de Investigación de Accidentes e Incidentes de Aviación Civil. (2008). Accident involving 
a McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82 (MD-82) aircraft, registration EC-HFP, operated by Spanair, at 
Madrid-Barajas Airport, on 20 August 2008 (Report A-032/2008). Madrid, Spain. 
Commercial Aviation Safety Team. (2008). Mode awareness and energy state management aspects 
of flight deck automation, Final report - Safety enhancement 30, Revision 5. Retrieved from 
http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/1581.pdf 
de Brito, G. (1998, May). Study of the use of airbus flight deck procedures and perspectives for 
operational documentation. In G. Boy, C. Graeber, & J. M. Robert (Eds.), International 
Conference on Human Computer Interaction in Aeronautics, HCI-Aero'98 (pp. 195-201), Ecole 
Polytechnique de Montréal, Montreal, Canada. 
de Brito, G. (2002). Towards a model for the study of written procedure following in dynamic 
environments. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 75, 233-244. 
de Brito, G., & Boy, G. (1999, September). Situation awareness and procedure following. Seventh 
European Conference on Cognitive Science Approaches to Process Control (CSAPC'99), Paper 
presented at the European Association of Cognitive Ergonomics, Villeneuve d'Ascq, France. 
Degani, A. (1999, April). Pilot-error in the 90’s: Still alive and kicking. Paper presented at the 
meeting of the Flight Safety Foundation of the National Business Aviation Association, 
Cincinnati, OH. 
Degani, A. (2003a). Procedures, synchronization, and automation. In Taming Hal (pp. 177-199). 
New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Degani, A. (2003b). Taming Hal. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Degani, A. (2013, July). A tale of two maps: Analysis of the London Underground “Diagram.” 
Ergonomics in Design, 21(3), 7-16. 
Degani, A. (n.d.). Schemes and techniques of information organization: The case of the London 
underground “diagram” (Human-Machine Interface GM Report). Israel: GM Advanced 
Technical Center. 
Degani, A., Barshi, I., & Shafto, M. (2013). Information organization in the airline cockpit: Lessons 
from flight 236. Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making, 7, 330-352. doi: DOI: 
10.1177/1555343413492983 
Degani, A., Heymann, M., & Shafto, M. (1999). Formal aspects of procedures: The problem of 
sequential correctness. Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 43rd Annual 
Meeting, TX, Vol. 43(20), 1113-1117. 
Degani, A., & Wiener, E. (1990). Human factors of flight-deck checklists: The normal checklist 
(NASA Contractor Report 177549). Retrieved from SKYbrary 
http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/1568.pdf 
Degani, A., & Wiener, E. (1993). Cockpit checklists: Concepts, design, and use. Human Factors, 
35(2), 28-43. 
Degani, A., & Wiener, E. (1994a). On the design of flight-deck procedures (NASA Contractor 
Report 177642). Retrieved from NASA website:http://ti.arc.nasa.gov/m/profile/adegani/Flight-
Deck_Procedures.pdf  
  
62 
 
Degani, A., & Wiener, E. (1994b). Philosophies, policies, procedures, and practices: The four ‘P’s of 
flight deck operations. In N. Johnston, N. McDonald, & R. Fuller (Eds.), Aviation Psychology in 
Practice (pp. 44-67). 
Degani, A., & Wiener, E. (1998). Design and operational aspects of flight-deck procedures. 
Proceedings of the International Air Transport Association (IATA) Annual Meeting, Montreal, 
Canada. 
Dismukes, R. K., & Berman, B. A. (2010). Checklists and monitoring in the cockpit: Why crucial 
defenses sometimes fail (NASA Technical Memorandum Report No. 2010-216396). Moffett 
Field, CA. 
Dismukes, R. K., Berman, B. A., & Loukopoulos, L. D. (2007). The limits of expertise: Rethinking 
crew error and the causes of airline accidents. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
Drury, C. G. (2000). Development and use of the documentation design aid. Proceedings of the 
IEA/HFES Congress, 44(22), 783-786. Retrieved from 
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/maintenance_hf/library/documents/media/roi/development_
and_use_of_the_documentation_design_aid_.pdf 
Drury, C. G., & Gramopadhye, A. K. (1992, August). Training for visual inspection: Controlled 
studies and field implications. Proceedings of the Seventh Federal Aviation Administration 
Meeting on Human Factor Issues in Aircraft Maintenance and Inspection: Science, Technology, 
and Management: A Program Review (pp. 135-146). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/maintenance_hf/library/documents/media/mx_faa_%28form
erly_hfskyway%29/human_factors_issues/meeting_7/trainingforvisualinspection.pdf 
European Aviation Safety Agency IGPT. (2013, January 14). EASA automation policy: Bridging 
design and training principles, EASp Action SYS5.6 – Automation policy. Retrieved from 
EASA website: http://easa.europa.eu/sms/docs/EASp%20SYS5.6%20-%20Automation%20 
Policy%20-%2014%20Jan%202013.pdf 
Federal Aviation Administration. (1978). Water, slush, and snow on the runway. (Advisory Circular 
91-6A). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/
documentID/23145 
Federal Aviation Administration. (1981, January). Operations of large airplanes subject to federal 
aviation regulation part 125. (Advisory Circular 125-1). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/
documentID/22524 
Federal Aviation Administration. (1983, March). Pilots’ role in collision avoidance.(Advisory 
Circular 90-48c). Retrieved from FAA website:  
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/
documentID/23090 
Federal Aviation Administration. (1990a, June). Operational landing distances for wet runways; 
Transport category airplanes. (Advisory Circular 121-195(d)-1A). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/
documentID/22523  
  
63 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (1990b). Traffic advisory practices at airports without operating 
control towers. (Advisory Circular 90-42F). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/
documentID/23088  
Federal Aviation Administration. (1993, August). Recommended standards traffic patterns and 
practices for aeronautical operations at airports without operating control towers. (Advisory 
Circular 90-66A). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/
documentid/23093 
Federal Aviation Administration. (1995). Human performance considerations in the use and design 
of aircraft checklists. Retrieved from SKYbary website: 
http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/1566.pdf 
Federal Aviation Administration. (1996, April). Operational use and modification of electronic 
checklists. (Advisory Circular 120-64). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/
documentID/23204  
Federal Aviation Administration. (2000). Standard operating procedures for flight deck 
crewmembers (Advisory Circular 120-71). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/list/AC%20120-
71/$FILE/AC120-71.pdf 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2002, November). Aviation safety reporting system (ASRS). 
(Advisory Circular 120-66B). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/list/AC%20120-
66B/$FILE/AC120-66B.pdf  
Federal Aviation Administration. (2003a, September). Parts 91, 121, 125, and 135 flightcrew 
procedures during taxi operations. (Advisory Circular 120-74A). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/
documentid/23220 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2003b). Standard operating procedures for flight deck 
crewmembers (Advisory Circular 120-71A). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/
documentID/23216 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2003c). Standard terminal arrival program and procedures 
[Order 7100.9D]. Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/7100.9D.pdf 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2004a). Airplane flying handbook. Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aircraft/airplane_handbook/media/
FAA-H-8083-3B.pdf  
Federal Aviation Administration. (2004b, January). Crew resource training. (Advisory Circular 120-
51E). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC120-51e.pdf  
  
64 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2004c, April). Flight operational quality assurance. (Advisory 
Circular 120-82). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/
documentID/23227 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2005, November). Dispatch resource management (DRM) 
training. (Advisory Circular 121-32A). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/
documentID/22513 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2007a). Confirming the takeoff runway [Safety Alert for 
Operators 07003]. Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/safo/all_safos/
media/2007/safo07003.pdf 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2007b, September). Manuals, procedures, and checklists for 14 
CFR Parts 91K, 121, 125, and 135 (Flight Standards Information Management Systems 8900.1, 
Vol 3, Chapter 32, Section 1). Washington: Author. 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2007c, September). Manuals, procedures, and checklists for 14 
CFR Parts 91K, 121, 125, and 135 (Flight Standards Information Management Systems 8900.1, 
Vol 3, Chapter 32, Section 12). Washington: Author. 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2007d). Runway light required for night takeoffs part 121 [InFO 
07009]. Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/info/all_infos/
media/2007/info07009.pdf 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2007e, November). Runway overrun prevention. (Advisory 
Circular 91-79). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/
documentID/73552 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2007f, December). Pilot guide: Flight in icing conditions. 
(Advisory Circular 91-74A). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/
documentID/74471  
Federal Aviation Administration. (2008a, May). Approach and landing accident reduction (ALAR): 
Recommended flightcrew training [InFO 08029]. Retrieved from FAA website: 
https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/info/all_infos/
media/2008/info08029.pdf  
Federal Aviation Administration. (2008b, May). Design and content of check-lists for in-flight 
smoke, fire and fumes (SFF) [InFO 08034]. Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/info/all_infos/
media/2008/info08034.pdf 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2008c, July). Checklist review [InFO 08041]. Retrieved from 
FAA website: 
https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/info/all_infos/
media/2008/info08041.pdf 
  
65 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2010a). Industry best practices reference list [InFO 10002). 
Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/info/all_infos/
media/2010/info10002SUP.pdf 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2010b). NAV lean: Instrument flight procedures. Retrieved from 
FAA website: http://www.faa.gov/nextgen/media/NAV%20Lean%20Final%20Report.pdf 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2010c, June). Part 121 air carrier operational control. (Advisory 
Circular 120-101). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/
documentid/305074 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2010d). Scope and recommended content for a contractual 
agreement between an air carrier and a contract maintenance provider (CMP). (Advisory 
Circular 120-106). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/
documentID/780197  
Federal Aviation Administration. (2011). Title 14 Aeronautics and space [electronic database]. 
Retrieved from FAA website: http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/faa_regulations/  
Federal Aviation Administration. (2012a, July). Parts 91, 121, 125, and 135 flightcrew procedures 
during taxi operations. (Advisory Circular 120-74B). Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/
documentID/1020233 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2012b). Standard operating procedures (SOP) for title 14 of the 
code of federal regulations (14 CFR) part 135 certificate holders and part 91K program 
managers [Safety Alert for Operators 12003]. Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/safo/all_safos/
media/2012/SAFO12003.pdf  
Federal Aviation Administration. (2013a). Aircraft equipment and operational authorization. Flight 
Standards Information Management Systems 8900.1, Vol 4, Chapter 2, Section 5. Retrieved on 
8/16/2012 from FAA website: 
http://fsims.faa.gov/PICDetail.aspx?docId=8900.1,Vol.4,Ch2,Sec5  
Federal Aviation Administration. (2013b). Flight standards information management systems 
8900.1. Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://fsims.faa.gov/PICResults.aspx?mode=EBookContents  
Federal Aviation Administration. (2013c). Safety attribute inspection (SAI) data collection tool: 
3.1.3 Airman duties / flightdeck procedures (OP). Flight Standards Information Management 
Systems 8900.1, ATOS Data Collection Tool, 3.0 Flight Operations, 3.1 Air Carrier Programs 
and Procedures, SAI 3.1.3. Retrieved on from FAA website: 
http://fsims.faa.gov/PICDetail.aspx?docId=SAI%203.1.3%20%28OP%29 
Flight Deck Automation Working Group. (2013). Operational use of flight path management system 
- Final report of the PARC/CAST flight deck automation WG.  Retrieved from FAA website: 
http://www.nbaa.org/ops/safety/Final_Report_Recommendations.pdf  
  
66 
 
Flight Safety Foundation. (1993, September/October). ‘Hurry up’ syndrome identified as causal 
factor in aviation safety accidents. Flight Safety Foundation: Human Factors & Aviation 
Medicine, 40(5), 1-5.  
Flight Safety Foundation. (2000a, August-December). FSF ALAR briefing note: 1.1 - Operating 
philosophy. Retrieved from FSF website: http://flightsafety.org/files/alar_bn1-1-
ops_philosophy.pdf 
Flight Safety Foundation. (2000b, August-November). Standard operating procedures template (pp. 
6-9). Retrieved from FSF website: http://flightsafety.org/files/alar_bn1-1-ops_philosophy.pdf  
Flight Safety Foundation (Eds.). (2005a, June). Flight crew procedures streamlines for 
smoke/fire/fumes. Flight Safety Digest, 24(6), 31-36.  
Flight Safety Foundation (Eds). (2005b, June). ‘Paperless cockpit’ promises advances in safety, 
efficiency. Flight Safety Digest, 24(6), 1-30.   
Flight Safety Foundation. (2009a). FSF ALAR briefing note 1.2 - Automation (Issue Brief No. 1.2). 
Alexandria, VA: Author. 
Flight Safety Foundation. (2009b). FSF approach and landing accident reduction toolkit briefing 
note: 1.1 - Operating philosophy (Issue Brief No. 1.1). Alexandria, VA: Author. 
Fucks, I., & Dien, Y. (2013). ‘No rule, no use’? The effects of over-proceduralization. In M. 
Bourrier & C. Bieder, Trapping safety into rules: How desirable or avoidable is 
proceduralization? (pp. 27-38). Burlington, VT: Ashgate.  
Funk, K. (2009). A methodology and tools for the prospective identification of NEXTGEN human 
factors issues. Proceedings of the International Symposium of Aviation Psychology, Dayton, OH, 
106-111. Retrieved from 
http://classes.engr.oregonstate.edu/mime/spring2009/ie548/Resources/NextGen.pdf  
Funk, K., Mauro, R., & Barshi, I. (2009). NextGen flight deck human factors issues. Proceedings of 
the 15th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Dayton, OH, 208-213. Retrieved 
from http://web.engr.oregonstate.edu/~funkk/Publications/NextGenIssuesISAP2009.pdf 
George, F. (2015, April). Checklists and callouts: Keep it simple, avoid distraction, prevent 
ineptitude. Business & Commercial Aviation. Retrieved from: http://aviationweek.com/business-
aviation/checklists-and-callouts-keep-it-simple-avoid-distraction-prevent-ineptitude 
Giles, C. N. (2013). Modern airline pilots’ quandary: Standard operating procedures - to comply or 
not to comply. Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering, 2(2), 2-12. 
Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg. (2003). Accident of Fokker 27 Mk050 registered LX-LGB, LG 
9642/LH 2420. Niederanven, Luxembourg. November 6, 2002. Luxembourg, Europe. Retrieved 
from http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/674.pdf  
Gross, R. L. & Eds. (1995, May). Studies suggest methods for optimizing checklist design and crew 
performance. Flight Safety Digest, 14(5), 1-10. 
Grote, G. (2009). Coordination in organizations: Creating flexible routines. In Management of 
uncertainty: Theory and application in the design of systems and organizations (pp. 57-74). 
London: Springer-Verlag. 
  
67 
 
Grote, G., & Zala-Mezö, E. (2004). The effects of different forms of coordination in coping with 
workload: Cockpit versus operating theatre (Report on the psychological part of the project). 
Retrieved from ETH Institutional Repository website: 
 http://e-collection.library.ethz.ch/eserv/eth:27237/eth-27237-01.pdf 
Hale, J. (1990). Safety rules o.k.? Possibilities and limitations in behavioural safety strategies. 
Journal of Occupational Accidents, 12, pp. 3-20. 
Hale A., Borys D., & Else D. (2012). Management of safety rules and procedures: A review of the 
literature (Research Report 12.3). Retrieved from The Institute of Occupational Safety and 
Health website:  www.iosh.co.uk/rulesandprocedures  
Hale, A.R., Heijer, T., & Koornneef, F. (2003). Management of safety rules: The case of railways 
[Online forum]. Safety Science Monitor, 7(1), 1-11. Retrieved from Safety Science Monitor 
website: http://ssmon.chb.kth.se/vol7/3-2.pdf  
Hale, A.R., & Swuste, P. (1998). Safety rules: procedural freedom or action constraint? Safety 
Science, 29, 163-177. 
Herry, N. (1987). Errors in the execution of prescribed instructions: Design of process control work 
aids. In Rasmussen, J., Duncan, K., & Leplat, J. (Eds), New technology and human error (pp. 
239-245). Chichester, UK: Wiley. 
Heymann, M., Degani, A., & Barshi, I. (2007). Generating Procedures and Recovery Sequences: A 
Formal Approach.  Proceedings of the 14th International Symposium of Aviation Psychology, 
April 22-25, 2007, Dayton, Ohio, 252-257. 
Hilton, B. (2012). Comparing the effects of simulated, intelligent audible, checklists and analog 
checklists in simulated flight (Doctoral dissertation, Western Michigan University). Retrieved 
from http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/dissertations/109/ 
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations. (2009, February). Procedure use and adherence. (INPO 09-
004). Retrieved from Energy Facility Contractor’s Group website: 
http://www.efcog.org/wg/ism_pmi_hpi/docs/DOE_and_INPO_Documents/09-
004%20Procedure%20Use.pdf 
International Civil Aviation Organization. (2006). Aircraft Operations: Volume 2 - Procedures for 
air navigation services - Construction of visual and instrument flight procedures (Doc 8168, 5th 
ed.). Montréal, Canada: Author. 
International Civil Aviation Organization. (2007). Aircraft operations: Volume 1 - Flight procedures 
(Doc 8168, 5th ed.). Retrieved from Information Handling Services website: 
http://www.ihs.com/products/industry-standards/org/icao/manuals/index.aspx  
Johnston, N. (2003). The paradox of rules: Procedural drift in commercial aviation. In R. Jensen 
(Ed), Proceedings of the Twelfth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, April 14-17, 
Dayton, Ohio. 
Joint Aviation Authorities. (2007). JAR-OPS subpart P: Manuals, logs and records. Joint aviation 
requirements JAR-OPS 1 Commercial air transportation (Aeroplanes), Section 1, Amendment 
12, pp. 229-238. Retrieved from JAA website: http://www.jaa.nl/publications/jars/jar-ops-1.pdf 
  
68 
 
Kanki, B. G., & Seamster, T. L. (2003, February). Operating documents: From documents to data. 
Presented at the FAA Air Transportation Human Factors Research Review Meeting, Irvine, CA.  
Kanki, B. G., Seamster, T. L., Lopez, M., Thomas, R. J., & LeRoy, W. W. (2001). Design and use of 
operating documents. Proceedings of the 11th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 
Dayton, OH. Retrieved from NASA website: http://human-factors.arc.nasa.gov/opdoc-
workshopIV/OPDOC_1.pdf  
Klement, R. E. (1995, October). Procedure preparation for ISO 9000 certification. Paper presented 
at the American Production Inventory Control Society International Conference and Exhibition, 
Orlando, FL. Retrieved from OSTI website: http://www.osti.gov/scitech/servlets/purl/132703 
Kurtz, K. (2013, Quarter 01). Interactive version of the quick reference handbook: Fault 
troubleshooting with interactive fault isolation manual. The Boeing Edge Aeromagazine, Is. 49, 
11-13. Retrieved from Boeing website: 
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/articles/2013_q1/pdf/AERO_2013q1.pdf  
Lacagnina, M. (2013, July). Automation surprise. Aerosafety World Magazine, 50-51. Retrieved 
from FSF website: http://flightsafety.org/aerosafety-world-magazine/july-2013/on-record  
Landry, S. J., Jacko, J. A., & Coulter, W. H. (2006). Impact of the use of Techniques and Situation 
Awareness on Pilots' Procedure Compliance. Proceedings of the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting 50th, 40-44. doi: 10.1177/154193120605000109 
Latorella, K. A., & Drury, C. G. (1992). A framework for human reliability in aircraft inspection. 
Proceedings Seventh Federal Aviation Administration Meeting on Human Factors Issues in 
Aircraft Maintenance and Inspection: Science, technology, and management: A program review 
(pp. 71-82). Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration/Office of Aviation Medicine. 
Lawton, R. (1998). Not working to rule: Understanding procedural violations at work. Safety 
Science, 28(2), 77-95. 
Layton, C. F. (1992). Emerging technologies for maintenance job aids. Proceedings of the Seventh 
Federal Aviation Administration Meeting on Human Factors Issues in Aircraft Maintenance and 
Inspection: Science, technology, and management: A program review (pp. 107-124). 
Washington, DC:Federal Aviation Administration/Office of Aviation Medicine. Retrieved from 
FAA website: 
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/maintenance_hf/library/documents/media/mx_faa_%28form
erly_hfskyway%29/human_factors_issues/meeting_7/emergingtechnologies.pdf 
Lindvall, J. (2011). Aeronautical decision-making in context: Influence of affect and experience on 
procedure violations (Doctoral dissertation, Department of Psychology, University of 
Gothenburg, Sweden). 
Loukopoulos, L. D., Dismukes, R. K., & Barshi, I. (2009). The multitasking myth: Handling 
complexity in real-world operations. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
Lupton, L. R., Lipsett, J. J., Olmstead, R. A., & Davey, E. C. (1990, July). A foundation for 
allocating control functions to humans and machine in future CANDU nuclear power plants. 
Paper presented at the International Symposium on Balancing Automation and Human Action in 
Nuclear Power Plants, Munich, Germany. Retrieved from International Atomic Energy Agency 
website: http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/23/002/23002192.pdf  
  
69 
 
Mauro, R., Barshi, I., & Pederson, S. (2001). Affect, Experience, & Aeronautical Decision-making. 
Proceedings of the 11th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Ohio State 
University. 
Mauro, R., Degani, A., Loukopoulos, L., & Barshi, I. (2012). The operational context of procedures 
and checklists in commercial aviation. Proceedings of the 56th Annual Meeting of the Human 
Factors and Ergonomics Society, (pp. 758-762). 
McLaughlin, A.C. (2010, October). What makes a good checklist: Perspective [online forum]. 
Retrieved from the United States Department of Health and Human Services Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality: Morbidity & Mortality Rounds on the Web website: 
http://webmm.ahrq.gov/perspective.aspx?perspectiveID=92 
Mosier, K. L., Palmer, E. A., & Degani, A. (1992). Electronic checklists: Implications for decision 
making. Proceedings of the 36th Annual Meeting of the Human Factors Society. Santa Monica, 
CA, 7-11. doi: 10.1177/154193129203600104. Retrieved from SAGE website: 
http://pro.sagepub.com/content/36/1/7.full.pdf+html 
National Transportation Safety Board. (1988). Aircraft Accident Report: Northwest Airlines, Inc., 
McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82, N312RC, Detroit Vletropolitan Wayne County Airport, Romulus, 
Michigan. August 16, 1987 (Aircraft accident report, NTSWAAR-88/OS). Washington, DC. 
National Transportation Safety Board. (2000a). Controlled flight into terrain, Korean airflight 801, 
Boeing 747-300, HL7468. Nimitz Hill, Guam. August 6, 1997 (Aircraft accident report, 
NTSB/AAR-00/01). Washington, DC. 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, & Federal Aviation Administration. (2000b). 
NASA/FAA Operating documents project: Developing operating documents: A manual of 
guidelines -- E-Version. Retrieved from NASA website: http://human-
factors.arc.nasa.gov/opdoc-workshopIV/Opdocfinal.pdf  
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, & Federal Aviation Administration. (2004, 
January). ASRS Callback: Checklist checkup (Issue 292). Retrieved from: 
http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/publications/callback/cb_292.htm 
National Transportation Safety Board. (2007a). Attempted takeoff from wrong runway, Comair flight 
5191, Bombardier CL-600-2B19, N431CA. Lexington, Kentucky. August 27, 2006 (Aircraft 
accident report, NTSB/AAR-07/05). Washington, DC. 
National Transportation Safety Board. (2007b). Runway overrun and collision, Southwest airlines 
flight 1248, Boeing 737-7H4, N471WN. Chicago Midway International Airport, Chicago, 
Illinois. December 8, 2005 (Aircraft accident report, NTSB/AAR-07/06). Washington, DC. 
National Transportation Safety Board. (2009). In-flight left engine fire, American airlines flight 
1400, McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82, N454AA. St. Louis, Missouri. September 28, 2007 (Aircraft 
accident report, NTSB/AAR-09/03). Washington, DC. 
National Transportation Safety Board. (2010). Loss of control on approach, Colgan air, Inc., 
Operating as continental connection flight 3407, Bombardier DHC-8-400, N200WQ. Clarence 
Center, New York. February 12, 2009 (Aircraft accident report, NTSB/AAR-10/01). 
Washington, DC. 
  
70 
 
National Transportation Safety Board. (2011a). Crash during approach to landing, Empire airlines 
flight 8284, Avions de transport régional aerospatiale alenia ATR 42-320, N902FX. Lubbock, 
Texas. January 27, 2009 (Aircraft accident report, NTSB/AAR-11/02). Washington, DC. 
National Transportation Safety Board. (2011b). Runway collision of USAir flight 1493, Boeing 737 
and Skywest flight 5569, Fairchild metroliner. Los Angeles International Airport, Los Angeles, 
California. February 1, 1991 (Aircraft accident report, NTSB/AAR-91/08). Washington, DC. 
National Transportation Safety Board. (2013). Southwest airlines, Flight 812, Boeing 737-3H4, 
N632SW. Yuma International Airport, Yuma, Arizona. April 11, 2011 (Aircraft accident report, 
NTSB/AAB-13/02). Washington, DC. 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, & Federal Aviation Administration.  (2014, 
March). ASRS Callback: Checklist checkup (Issue 410). Retrieved from: 
http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/publications/callback/cb_410.html 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, & Federal Aviation Administration. (2015, 
September). ASRS Callback: A checklist checklist (Issue 428). 
Neville, R. & Dey, M. (2012, Quarter 01). Innovative 787 flight deck designed for efficiency, 
comfort, and commonality. Boeing Aeromagazine, Is. 45, 11-17. Retrieved from Boeing website: 
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/articles/2012_q1/index.html  
NLR Air Transport Safety Institute. (n.d.). Airline industry survey of hazards associated with 
reliance on flight deck automation. Retrieved from NLR-ATSI website: http://www.nlr-
atsi.nl/fast/AIRLINE%20INDUSTRY%20SURVEY%20OF%20HAZARDS%20ASSOCIATED
%20WITH%20RELIANCE.pdf 
Norman, D. A. (2005, July/August). Human-centered design considered harmful.Interactions, 14-19. 
Novick, D., & Chater, M. (1999, September). Evaluating the design of human-machine cooperation: 
The cognitive walkthrough for operating procedures. Proceedings of the Conference on 
Cognitive Science Approaches to Process Control, Villeneuve d'Ascq, FR. Retrieved from 
University of Texas at El Paso Computer Science website: 
http://www.cs.utep.edu/novick/papers/cw-op.csapc99.html 
Nuclear Energy Institute. (2014). Emergency Response Procedures and Guidelines for Extreme 
Events and Severe Accidents. Retrieved from 
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1404/ML14049A005.pdf 
Nuclear Information Management Strategic Leadership. (2006, August). Procedure writers’ manual 
(NEI AP-907-005, Rev. 0). Nuclear Energy Institute: Washington, DC. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (1995). NRC Inspection manual - Inspection procedure 42700. 
Retrieved from NRC website: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-
manual/inspection-procedure/ip42700.pdf  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2007). Standard review plan: Human factors engineering 
(NUREG 0800, Rev 2). Retrieved from NRC website: 
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0706/ML070670253.pdf 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2010). NRC Inspection manual - Inspection Procedure 42401. 
Retrieved from NRC website: http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0801/ML080140332.pdf  
  
71 
 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2012). Human factors engineering - Program review model 
(NUREG-0711, Rev. 3). Retrieved from NRC website: 
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1232/ML12324A013.pdf 
Ockerman, J., & Pritchett, A. (2000). A Review and Reappraisal of Task Guidance: Aiding Workers 
in Procedure Following. International Journal of Cognitive Ergonomics, 4(3), 191–212. 
Orasanu, J., Mosier, K., & Fischer, U. (2012). Recommended updates to FAA advisory circular No. 
120-51E on crew resource management (Report #4). FAA/NASA NextGen Flight Deck Human 
Factors Research Interagency Agreement #DTFAWA-10-X-80005, Annex 9. Unpublished 
report. 
Palmer, E. A., and Degani, A. (1991). Electronic checklist: Evaluation of two levels of automation. 
In Proceedings of the Sixth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology (pp. 178–183). 
Columbus, OH: Ohio State University. 
Park, J., & Jung, W. (2003). The operators’ non-compliance behavior to conduct emergency 
operating procedures — Comparing with the work experience and the complexity of procedural 
steps. Journal of the Korean Nuclear Society, 35(5), 412-425. 
Pélegrin, C. (2007, December). Compliance to operational procedures: Why do well trained and 
experienced pilots not always follow procedures? Safety First: The  Airbus Magazine, 5, 20-23. 
Pélegrin, C. (2013). The never-ending story of proceduralization in aviation. In M.Bourrier & C. 
Bieder, Trapping safety into rules: How desirable or avoidable is proceduralization? (pp. 13-
24). Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
Procedures Professionals Association. (2011). Procedures process description PPA AP907-001 
Revision 1. Retrieved from PPA website: http://www.ppaweb.org/documents/PPA-AP-907-
001.pdf 
Rantz, W. G. (2005). Strategies for controlling checklist behaviors: A literature review. Proceedings 
of the 13th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology (pp. 497-503). Columbus, OH: The 
Ohio State University. 
Rantz, W. G. (2009). Comparing the accuracy of performing digital and paper and pencil checklists 
using a feedback package during normal workload conditions in simulated flight (Doctoral 
dissertation). Western Michigan University: Michigan. 
Rantz, W. G. (2010). Using graphic feedback to eliminate checklist segment timing errors. Journal 
of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, 20(1). Retrieved from 
http://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol20/iss1/8. 
Rantz, W. G., Dickinson, A. M., Sinclair, G. A., & Van Houten, R. (2009). The effect of feedback 
on the accuracy of checklist completion during instrument flight training. Journal of Applied 
Behavior Analysis, 42(3), 497-509. 
Rantz, W. G., & Van Houten, R. (2011). A feedback intervention to increase digital and paper 
checklist performance in technically advanced aircraft simulation. Journal of Applied Behavior 
Analysis, 44(1), 145-150. 
Romera, M. E., & Degani, A. (2000). Using finite automata to represent mental models (NASA 
Technical Memorandum #2000–000000). Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. 
  
72 
 
Schelling, T. C. (1985). Enforcing rules on oneself. Journal of Law and Economics,1(2), 357-374. 
Schulmann, P. (2013). Procedural paradoxes and the management of safety. In C.Bieder & M. 
Bourrier (Eds.), Trapping safety into rules (pp. 243-254). Burlington, VA: Ashgate. 
Seamster, T. L., Boehm-Davis, D. A., Holt, R. W., & Schultz, K. (1998). Developing advanced crew 
resource management (ACRM) training: A training manual. Retrieved from the FAA website: 
https://www.faa.gov/training_testing/training/aqp/training/manual/media/dacrmt.pdf 
Seamster, T. L. & Kanki, B. G. (2003) Structured information for flight operations and the flight 
deck. In Proceedings of the 12th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, (pp. 1042-
1046). Dayton, OH: Wright State University. 
Seamster, T. L., & Kanki, B. G. (2005). Human factors design of electronic documents. In 
Proceedings of the 12th International Symposium of Aviation Psychology. Dayton, OH: Wright 
State University.  
Shaw, J. (2013, Quarter 02). Faster troubleshooting with interactive fault management. Fault 
troubleshooting with interactive fault isolation manual. The Boeing Edge Aeromagazine, Is. 50, 
19-23. Retrieved from Boeing website: 
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/articles/2013_q2/pdf/AERO_2013q2.pdf 
Singer, G., & Dekker, S. W. A. (2000). Pilot performance during multiple failures: An empirical 
study of different warning systems. Transportation Human Factors, 2(1), 63-76. 
Statens Haverickommission. (1993). Air traffic accident on 27 December 1991 at Gottrora, AB 
county, Case L-124/91. Retrieved from SKYbary website: 
http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/540.pdf 
Sukenik, N. (1998). Coordination in the cockpit: A game-theory view of standard operation 
procedures. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 8(4), 405-412. 
Sumwalt, R. (2003, August). Using procedures to enhance crew vigilance. Professional Pilot, 2-6. 
Surabattula, D., & Landry, S. J. (2011, August). Toward providing guidance for procedure design: 
Formal definitions of procedure characteristics. Proceedings of the 2001 International 
Symposium on Resilient Control Systems, Boise, ID. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ISRCS.2011.6016079 
Tarnowski, E. (1999, November/December). Understanding design philosophy can help pilots 
benefit from modern automated flight systems. ICAO Journal, 22-30. 
Transportation Safety Board. (2012). In-flight fire leading to collision with water, Swissair transport 
limited, McDonnell Douglas MD-11 HB-IWF. Peggy’s Cove, Nova Scotia 5 nm SW. September 
2, 1998 (Report number, A98H0003). Retrieved from Transportation Safety Board of Canada 
website: http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/1998/a98h0003/a98h0003.pdf 
Tremaud, M. (2002, October). Operational and human factors involved in situations beyond the 
scope of published procedures. Symposium conducted at the meeting of the Airbus 16th Human 
Factors Symposium, Singapore. 
Tremaud, M. (2005, December). Guidelines for management of complex situations: An operational 
and human factors view. Presentation at the Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar, 
Moscow, Russia. 
  
73 
 
Turner, T. P. (2001). Controlling pilot error: Checklists and compliance. McGraw-Hill: New York. 
Turner, J. W., & Huntley Jr., M. S. (1991, April). The use and design of flightcrew checklists and 
manuals (Report No. FAA-AM-91-07). Washington, D.C. 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, The National Commission for the Protection of 
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. (1979). The belmont report - Ethical 
principles and guidelines for the protection of human subjects of research. Retrieved from the 
United States Department of Health and Human Services website: 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.html 
Veillette, P. R. (2006a, May). A non-error resistant checklist. Business & Commercial Aviation. 
Retrieved from: http://aviationweek.com/awin/non-error-resistant-checklist 
Veillette, P. R. (2006b, May). The what and whys of good procedures. Business & Commercial 
Aviation. Retrieved from: http://aviationweek.com/awin/what-and-why-good-procedures 
Veillette, P. R. (2006c, May). The who, what, when of your SOPs. Business & Commercial 
Aviation. Retrieved from: http://aviationweek.com/awin/who-what-when-your-sops 
Veillette, P. R. (2007, August). The problem of checklist errors. Business & Commercial Aviation. 
Retrieved from: http://aviationweek.com/awin/problem-checklist-errors 
Veillette, P. R. (2008, August). The benefits of proper checklist design. Business & Commercial 
Aviation. Retrieved from: http://aviationweek.com/awin/benefits-proper-checklist-design 
Veillette, P. R. (2012, January). Give e-checklists an A+. Business & Commercial Aviation. 
Retrieved from FAA website: http://lessonslearned.faa.gov/Northwest255/E_Checklists.pdf 
Veitengruber, J. E., & Rankin, W. L. (1995, March). Use of crew-centred design philosophy allows 
the introduction of new capabilities and technology. ICAO Journal, 20-22. 
Wickens, C. D. (1999a). Aerospace psychology. In M. Friedman, & E. Carterette (Eds.), Handbook 
of Perception and Cognition: Human Performance and Ergonomics (pp. 195-243). San Diego, 
CA: Academic Press. 
Wickens, C. D. (1999b). Cognitive factors in aviation. In F.T. Durso, R.S.  Nickerson, R.W. 
Schvaneveldt, S.T. Dumais, D.S. Lindsay, & M.T.H. Chi (Eds.), Handbook of Applied Cognition 
(pp. 247-282). Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons. 
Wickens, C. D. (2003). Pilot actions and tasks: Selections, execution, and control. In P. Tsang, & M. 
Vidulich (Eds.), Principles and Practices of Aviation Psychology (pp. 147-199). Mahwah: NJ. 
Wickens, C. D., & Andre, A. D. (1998). Psychology applied to aviation. In A. M. Stec, & D. 
Bernstein (Eds.), Psychology: Fields of application (pp. 184-198). Stamford, CT: Cengage 
Learning. 
 
 
 
